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Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable
Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and
Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes
Douglas K. Mollf
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of shareholder oppression attempts to
safeguard the close corporation minority investor from the
improper exercise of majority control.1 By identifying and
protecting the "reasonable expectations" of close corporation
shareholders, the oppression doctrine combats majority
shareholder efforts to exclude a minority investor from the
company's financial and participatory benefits.
2
The New York decision of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc. has
been particularly influential in shaping the "reasonable
expectations" framework.3 In Kemp, the Court of Appeals
stated that "oppressive actions.., refer to conduct that
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1. See, e.g., Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1996) (noting that the "thrust" of the oppression-triggered dissolution
statute "is protection from the abusive exercise of power"); id. at 128 ("[Ilt is
the 'wielding of... power' in a manner which 'destroy[s] a stockholder's vital
interest and expectations' that constitutes oppression.").
This Article uses the terms "majority shareholder" and "minority
shareholder" (or "majority" and "minority") "to distinguish those shareholders
who possess the actual power to control the operations of the firm from those
who do not." JA.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and
Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close
Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.7 (1977). Such power "is most
often determined by the size of shareholdings." Id.
2. See discussion infra Part I (describing the shareholder oppression
doctrine).
3. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984); see also infra text accompanying note 8.
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substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held by
minority shareholders in committing their capital to the
particular enterprise. ' As the court continued,
A slareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the
corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate
earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of
security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the
corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no
effective means of salvaging the investment....
... A court considering a petition alleging oppressive conduct
must investigate what the majority shareholders knew, or should
have known, to be the petitioner's expectations in entering the
particular enterprise. Majority conduct should not be deemed
oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective hopes and
desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment alone
should not necessarily be equated with oppression.
Rather, oppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority
conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed,
were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to
the petitioner's decision to join the venture.'
By speaking of expectations that are "held by minority
shareholders in committing their capital to the particular
enterprise" and are "central to [a shareholder's] decision to join
the venture," the Kemp formulation of the reasonable
expectations inquiry focuses on the shareholder's expectations
at the time it decided to invest in (and therefore join) the
business For the disputes that characterize most of the
published oppression decisions, this "time of investment" focus
is suitable, as the aggrieved shareholder usually complains
about expectations established around the time of the
shareholder's actual commitment of capital to the business.
7
Perhaps for this reason, other jurisdictions have followed Kemp
and have articulated a "time of investment" standard for their
reasonable expectations inquiries.8
4. Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also id. (noting that the aggrieved shareholder's expectations
"in entering the particular enterprise" are relevant); 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.28, at 9-173 (3d ed.
1996) [hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS] (noting that the Kemp court's "focus
[is] on the petitioner's expectations at the time he decided to join the
enterprise").
7. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
8. See, e.g., Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987)
(explaining that courts have analyzed oppressive conduct by looking in part to
"the 'reasonable expectations' held by the minority shareholders in committing
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In certain significant contexts, however, a time of
investment focus is problematic. One such area involves
changing shareholder expectations. For example, assume that
a 60% majority shareholder and two 20% minority shareholders
form a close corporation engaged in the sale of a particular
product. At the time the shareholders commit their capital to
the business, they all agree that the company needs only two
active managers. As a result, the majority and one of the
minority shareholders assume active management roles in the
business, while the other minority shareholder chooses to
remain as the passive investor. Six months later, the three
individuals realize for the first time that the growing business
will require a third manager. With the support of the other two
shareholders, the formerly passive minority assumes the third
management position. For the next twenty years, all three
shareholders participate actively in the management of the
business. At the end of that time period, the majority
unjustifiably removes both minority shareholders from their
positions.
In this scenario, only the first minority shareholder has a
reasonable expectation of management as of the time the
investments in the company were made. After all, it was six
months after the time of investment in the business when the
shareholders first saw the need for a third manager. As a
consequence, the second minority arguably did not reasonably
expect a management position until well after the time of
investment had passed. Thus, despite the near-equivalence of
the minority shareholders' situations-both investors have
participated in the management of the company, with the
support of the majority, for approximately twenty years-an
oppression doctrine premised on "time of investment"
their capital and labor to the particular enterprise"); Davis v. Sheerin, 754
S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App. 1988) ("[O]ppression should be deemed to arise
only when the majority's conduct substantially defeats the expectations that
objectively viewed were both reasonable under the circumstances and were
central to the minority shareholder's decision to join the venture."); see also
Lardner v. Port Huron Golf Club, LC, No. 89-695-NZ, slip op. at 6-7 (Mich. Ct.
App. Aug. 4, 1994) (citing and applying the Kemp framework). But see
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) (noting that
"reasonable expectations' are to be ascertained by examining the entire
history of the participants' relationship," including "the 'reasonable
expectations' created at the inception of the participants' relationship; those
'reasonable expectations' as altered over time; and the 'reasonable
expectations' which develop as the participants engage in a course of dealing
in conducting the affairs of the corporation").
2oo021
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expectations may protect the first minority shareholder but,
oddly, not the second.
A strict time of investment standard, therefore, seems to
ignore the possibility that post-investment expectations may
arise. One can imagine situations where a shareholder's
expectations have changed since the time of the initial
investment due to developments in the company, a changing
business climate, or the mere passage of years. Focusing on
one point in time-the time of investment-to measure the
shareholder's expectations fails to capture potentially valid and
reasonable expectations that may develop well after a
shareholder commits capital to the venture.9
Furthermore, a strict time of investment framework fails
to account for close corporation shareholders who have made no
investment in the company. This group of "non-investing
shareholders" includes, among others, stockholders who receive
their shares as gifts or inheritances.10 For example, assume
that a founding shareholder of a close corporation passes away
and bequeaths his stock in the company to his daughter. The
daughter, with the approval of the majority shareholder,
commences employment with the company in her father's
former position. For years, the daughter continues to work in
that position until the majority shareholder terminates her
without justification. Although the father, as a founding
shareholder, may have had a reasonable expectation of
employment, it is unclear whether the daughter has a similar
expectation, even assuming that she is equally as competent as
her father. Indeed, because the daughter has committed no
capital herself, there is, literally-speaking, no "time of
investment" peculiar to her. For this group of non-investing
shareholders, therefore, an assessment of reasonable
expectations at the time of investment may lead to a conclusion
that no specific reasonable expectations exist at all."
If these categories of cases remained as outliers, there
9. See, e.g., 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.28, at 9-173
(criticizing a "focus on the [shareholder's] expectations at the time [of
investment as] too narrow").
10. See, e.g., Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection
of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 326 (1990)
("Shareholders obtaining stock by operation of law, by purchase from a
minority shareholder, or by gift or inheritance, create a more difficult problem
for courts engaging in an expectations analysis.").




would be little need to think more critically about the time of
investment standard for measuring reasonable expectations.
Particularly with respect to disputes involving non-investing
shareholders, however, cases within these categories have
already begun to arise,12 and they will likely become
increasingly prevalent as the oppression doctrine continues to
develop. Indeed, because the business world inevitably changes
for any type of corporation, shareholder expectations will also
evolve and change. Moreover, given that "[flamily-owned
businesses alone represent ninety-five percent of all United
States businesses and are responsible for nearly fifty percent of
the jobs in the United States,"13 it is only natural for issues
relating to gifted and inherited stock to appear in the close
corporation context. Thus, while a time of investment focus for
the reasonable expectations inquiry may have sufficed for most
of the published oppression decisions to date, it is vitally
important to question the framework's suitability for these
other categories of cases.
This Article analyzes whether and how the reasonable
expectations inquiry could be applied to these changing
expectations and non-investing shareholder cases.' By
conceiving of oppression as a doctrine that protects the fair
value of the shareholder's investment, this Article provides a
context for thinking about the purpose of the shareholder
oppression doctrine and its accompanying reasonable
expectations inquiry. Using this "investment model" of
oppression as a guide, 5 the Article argues that the law should
view a reasonable expectation as a bargain struck between
12. See Maul v. Van Keppel, 714 N.E.2d 707, 711-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(gift/inheritance); Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 120-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1996) (inheritance); In re Schlachter, 546 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Div.
1989) (gift); In re Smith, 546 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383-84 (App. Div. 1989)
(inheritance); In re Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d
83, 86 (App. Div. 1985) (gift); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019
(Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1984) (gift/inheritance); Ferber v. Am. Lamp Corp., 469
A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. 1983) (inheritance); see also Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at
563 (addressing changing expectations).
13. Bahls, supra note 10, at 287.
14. In discussing the "particularly difficult situation" of "a spouse [who]
inherits the stock of a former active shareholder and [who] is relegated to...
passive investor" status, one commentator noted that the spouse's position
"warrants further scholarly attention." Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relevant
Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 86
n.265 (1982).
15. See infra Part M (describing the investment model of oppression).
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majority and minority shareholders over a specific entitlement
the minority is to receive in return for its investment in the
company. Because majority and minority shareholders may
strike these "investment bargains" throughout their
participation in a close corporation, the Article contends that
the oppression doctrine should look for evidence of such
bargains during the entirety of the shareholders' relationship,
rather than merely at the narrower time of investment. The
reasonable expectations inquiry, therefore, should reflect this
broader perspective. Moreover, although non-investing
stockholders do not, by definition, commit any of their own
capital to the company, they too may reach mutual
understandings with the majority that, if proven, should be
protected as investment bargains.
Part I of this Article discusses the nature of the close
corporation and explains the development of the doctrine of
shareholder oppression. Part II describes the investment
model of oppression and the special nature of the close
corporation shareholder's investment. While a time of
investment focus for measuring reasonable expectations is not
well-suited to disputes involving changing expectations or non-
investing shareholders, this Part explains that a time of
investment inquiry is nevertheless consistent with the theory of
the investment model. Building on this analysis, Part III
discusses the problems presented by shareholder expectations
that change over time. Because corporate law seeks to prevent
freeze-out conduct, this Part argues that the law should protect
post-investment expectations. Moreover, by drawing from
relational contract theory, this Part provides an additional
basis for validating and enforcing post-investment
expectations, even when the minority has provided no
additional consideration. Part IV explores the puzzle of the
non-investing shareholder and the various positions that the
oppression doctrine could take towards these parties. After
discussing whether non-investing shareholders should have (1)
no specific reasonable expectations at all, (2) only the specific
reasonable expectations of their investing transferors, or (3)
any specific reasonable expectations that can be proven, this
Part concludes that the third alternative promotes fairness and
provides consistency with the investment model of oppression.
Finally, Part V considers the role of the transferor's intent in
single-founder cases. Rather than serving to bind successor
shareholders, this Part suggests that the founder's intent
[Vol.86:717
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should serve merely as an evidentiary factor in the reasonable
expectations analysis.
I.THE DOCTRINE OF SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
A. THE NATURE OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION
A close corporation is a business organization typified by a
small number of stockholders, the absence of a market for the
corporation's stock, and substantial shareholder participation
in the management of the corporation. 6 In the traditional
public corporation, the shareholder is normally a detached
investor who neither contributes labor to the corporation nor
takes part in management responsibilities. 7 In contrast,
within a close corporation, "a more intimate and intense
relationship exists between capital and labor."' 8  Close
corporation shareholders "usually expect employment and a
meaningful role in management, as well as a return on the
money paid for [their] shares."' 9 Moreover, family or other
16. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in
the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1990)
("Close corporations have a limited number of shareholders, and most, if not
all, of the shareholders are active in the corporation's day-to-day business.").
The definition of a close corporation varies. See 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS,
supra note 6, § 1.02, at 4-6 (noting that the possible definitions of a "close
corporation" include: a corporation with "relatively few shareholders"; "a
corporation whose shares are not generally traded in the securities market"; a
corporation "in which the participants consider themselves partners
interesse"; a corporation in which -management and ownership are
substantially identical"; and "any corporation which elects to place itself in" a
close corporation grouping); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 338 (8th ed. 2000) (unabridged) ("Exactly
what constitutes a close corporation is a matter of theoretical dispute. Some
authorities emphasize the number of shareholders, some emphasize the
presence of owner-management, some emphasize the lack of a market for the
corporation's stock, and some emphasize the existence of formal restrictions on
the transferability of the corporation's shares."). Nevertheless, the typical
close corporation possesses most, if not all, of the attributes described in these
various definitions.
17. See 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 1.08, at 31-32.
18. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for
Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 702 (1993).
19. Id.; see, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) ("[The primary expectations of minority shareholders include an active
voice in management of the corporation and input as an employee."); 1 CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 7.02, at 4 ("Ownership and management
frequently coalesce in closely held corporations, where not uncommonly all the
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personal relationships typically link close corporation investors
20
such that a familiarity often exists between the participants.
Conventional corporate law norms of majority rule and
centralized control can lead to serious problems for the close
corporation minority shareholder.2' Traditionally, most
corporate power is centralized in the hands of a board of
22directors. In a close corporation, the board is ordinarily
controlled "by the shareholder' or shareholders holding a
majority of the voting power. " ' Through this control of the
board, the majority shareholder has the ability to take actions
that can harm the minority shareholder's interests.' Such
principal shareholders devote full time to corporate affairs. Even where one or
two shareholders may be inactive, the business is normally conducted by the
others without aid from nonshareholder managers.").
20. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and
Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 196 (1988); see
also Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., 616 A.2d 1314, 1320-21 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("[A] close[ corporation frequently originates in the
context of personal relationships. Often such business entities are formed by
family members or friends." (citations omitted)).
21. See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 1:02, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter OPPRESSION] (characterizing majority rule and centralized
management as the "traditional pattern of corporation management," and
noting the dangers that this management pattern presents to close
corporation minority shareholders); Thompson, supra note 18, at 702-03 ("In a
closed setting, the corporate norms of centralized control and majority rule
easily can become instruments of oppression.").
22. See REVISED MODEL BuSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1994) [hereinafter
RMBCA] ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority
of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the
direction of, its board of directors ... ."); Kleinberger, supra note 16, at 1152
("In traditional theory, ultimate authority resides with the board of
directors ....").
23. Kleinberger, supra note 16, at 1152; see, e.g., 1 OPPRESSION, supra
note 21, § 1:02, at 3 ("Indeed, in most closely held corporations, majority
shareholders elect themselves and their relatives to all or most of the positions
on the board.").
24. See Bostock, 616 A.2d at 1320 ("[Blased upon its voting power, 'the
majority is able to dictate to the minority the manner in which the [close]
corporation is run.'"); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (N.C.
1983) ("[Wlhen the personal relationships among the participants break down,
the majority shareholder, because of his greater voting power, is in a position
to terminate the minority shareholder's employment and to exclude him from
participation in management decisions."); Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. &
Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 267 (S.C. 2001) ("This unequal balance of power
often leads to a 'squeeze out' or 'freeze out' of the minority by the majority
shareholders." (footnote omitted)); see also Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d
351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("In the instant case [a group of four
shareholders], acting in concert, control a majority of the outstanding stock,
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actions are often referred to as "freeze-out" or "squeeze-out"
techniques' that "oppress" 26 the close corporation minority
shareholder. Common freeze-out techniques include the
termination of a minority shareholder's employment, the
refusal to declare dividends, the removal of a minority
shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning-
off of corporate earnings through high compensation to the
majority shareholder.7 Quite often, the majority shareholder
uses these tactics in combination. For example, the close
corporation investor typically looks to salary rather than
dividends for a share of the business returns because the
"[elarnings of a close corporation often are distributed in major
part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits."2 When
though no single shareholder owns 51%. Because this control carries the
power to destroy or impair the interests of minority owners, the law imposes
equitable limitations on the rights of dominant shareholders to act in their
own self-interest.").
25. See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 1:01, at 3 n.2 ("The term 'freeze-
out' is often used as a synonym for 'squeeze-out."). It has been noted that "the
term 'squeeze-oue... mean[s] the use by some of the owners or participants in
a business enterprise of strategic position, inside information, or powers of
control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to eliminate from
the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants." Id. at 1. Similarly, a
"partial squeeze-out" is defined as "action which reduces the participation or
powers of a group of participants in the enterprise, diminishes their claims on
earnings or assets, or otherwise deprives them of business income or
advantages to which they are entitled." Id. at 1-2. See generally 1
OPPRESSION, supra note 21, §§ 3:01-3:20, 4:01-4:06, 5:01-5:36 (discussing
various squeeze-out techniques); 2 id. §§ 6:01-6:10 (discussing various
squeeze-out techniques).
26. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing judicial
definitions of "oppression").
27. See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, §§ 3:04 at 18-25 (discussing
dividend withholdings), 3:06 at 44-66 (discussing the termination of minority
shareholders' employment), 3:07 at 66-71 (discussing the siphoning off of
earnings through high compensation to majority shareholders); see also
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975) (noting
some of the possible freeze-out techniques).
28. 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 1.08, at 32; see Kleinberger,
supra note 16, at 1148 ("Payout is frequently in the form of salary rather than
dividends.").
When calculating its taxable income, a close corporation can deduct
reasonable salaries paid to its employees to "reduce the amount of income tax
that the company pays." Thompson, supra note 20, at 197 n.12 (citing I.R.C. §
162 (1986)). A close corporation cannot, however, deduct any dividends paid to
its shareholders. As a consequence, dividends are subject to double taxation-
once as business income at the corporate level, and once as personal income at
the shareholder level. Id. at 197. Because of "[t]he tax system's
discouragement of dividends" in favor of salaries, "most close corporations
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actual dividends cease, therefore, a minority shareholder who
is discharged from employment and removed from the board of
directors is effectively denied any return on its investment as
well as any input into the management of the business. Once
the minority shareholder is faced with this "indefinite future
with no return on the capital he or she contributed to the
enterprise, "' ° the majority often proposes to purchase the
shares of the minority shareholder at an unfairly low price.
In the public corporation, the minority shareholder can
escape these abuses of power by simply selling its shares on the
market. By definition, however, there is no ready market for
the stock of a close corporation."' Thus, when unfair treatment
provide a return to participants in the form of salary or other employee-related
benefits." Thompson, supra note 18, at 714 n.90; see also 1 OPPRESSION, supra
note 21, § 1:03, at 4-5 ("[A] close corporation, in order to avoid so-called 'double
taxation,' usually pays out most of its earnings in the form of salaries rather
than as dividends.").
29. See, e.g., Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987)
("Balvik was ultimately fired as an employee of the corporation, thus
destroying the primary mode of return on his investment. Any slim hope of
gaining a return on his investment and remaining involved in the operations
of the business was dashed when Sylvester removed Balvik as a director and
officer of the corporation."); 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 1.15, at
89 ("An investor taking a minority investment position in a close corporation,
expecting to receive a return on the investment in the form of a regular salary,
would face the risk that, after a falling out among the participants, the
directors would terminate the minority shareholder's employment axd deprive
that investor of any return on the investment in the corporation.").
30. Thompson, supra note 18, at 703; see 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra
note 6, § 1.16, at 96 ("If, for example, the minority shareholder is fired from
the employment that was providing the return on the investment in the close
corporation, the minority may face an indefinite period with no return on the
investment."); Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for
Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 447 (1990) ("Mhe primary vulnerability of a
minority shareholder is the spectre of being 'locked-in,' that is, having a
perpetual investment in an entity without any expectation of ever receiving a
return on that investment.").
31. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 ("Majority 'freeze-out' schemes which
withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at
inadequate prices. When the minority stockholder agrees to sell out at less
than fair value, the majority has won." (citations omitted)); 1 CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.02, at 7 (noting that "[a] squeeze out usually
does not offer fair payment to the 'squeezees' for the interests, rights, or
powers which they lose"); Thompson, supra note 18, at 703-04 (noting that in a
classic freeze-out, "the majority first denies the minority shareholder any
return and then proposes to buy the shares at a very low price").
32. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 ("In a large public corporation, the
oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to
extricate some of his invested capital. By definition, this market is not
2002] SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
occurs through termination or otherwise, a close corporation
shareholder "cannot escape the unfairness simply by selling out
at a fair price. 3
B. THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR OPPRESSION
Over the years, state legislatures and courts have
developed two significant avenues of relief for the "oppressed"
close corporation shareholder. First, many state legislatures
have amended their corporate dissolution statutes to include
"oppression" by the controlling shareholder as a ground for
involuntary dissolution of the corporation.3 Moreover, when
oppressive conduct has occurred, actual dissolution is not the
only remedy at the court's disposal. Both state statutes and
judicial precedents have authorized alternative remedies that
are less drastic than dissolution.35 As the alternative forms of
available for shares in the close corporation."); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d
1019, 1027 (N.J. 1993) ("[U]nlike shareholders in larger corporations, minority
shareholders in a close corporation cannot readily sell their shares when they
become dissatisfied with the management of the corporation."); Bostock v.
High Tech Elevator Indus., 616 A.2d 1314, 1320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) ("[A] minority interest in a close] corporation is difficult to value
because the shares are not publicly traded and a fair market is often not
available."); 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.02, at 4-5 ("[A]
shareholder in a close corporation does not have the exit option available to a
shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who can sell shares in a securities
market if dissatisfied with the way the corporation is being operated.");
Thompson, supra note 18, at 702 ("[The economic reality of no public market
deprives investors in close corporations of the same liquidity and ability to
adapt available to investors in public corporations."); see also FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE EcONOMIc STRucTuRE OF
CORPORATE LAW 230-31 (1991) (noting that "the lack of an active market in
shares" prohibits close corporation shareholders from creating "homemade
dividends" by selling stock).
33. Kleinberger, supra note 16, at 1149; cf. Walensky v. Jonathan Royce
Int'l, Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) ("The interest
owned by a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation is often a
precarious one. In fact, it has been characterized by this court as being one of
'acute vulnerability.'").
34. Thompson, supra note 18, at 708. See generally Murdock, supra note
30, at 452-61 (describing the development of oppression as a ground for
dissolution).
35. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(1) (West Supp. 2000) (authorizing
any equitable relief and specifically authorizing a buyout of the shareholder's
interest); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7 (West Supp. 1999) (providing a
nonexclusive list of possible relief that includes the order of a buyout and the
appointment of a provisional director or custodian); Brenner, 634 A.2d at 1033
("Importantly, courts are not limited to the statutory remedies [for
oppression], but have a wide array of equitable remedies available to them.");
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388-89 (N.D. 1987) (listing alternative
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relief have broadened over the years, orders of actual
dissolution have become less frequent. 5 Thus, "oppression" has
evolved from a statutory ground for involuntary dissolution to a
statutory ground for a wide variety of relief.
3 7
Second, particularly in states without an oppression-
triggered dissolution statute, some courts have imposed an
enhanced fiduciary duty between close corporation
shareholders and have allowed an oppressed shareholder to
bring a direct cause of action for breach of this duty. 8 In the
seminal decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted such a
standard:
[W]e hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one
another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the
enterprise that partners owe to one another. In our previous
decisions, we have defined the standard of duty owed by partners to
one another as the "utmost good faith and loyalty." Stockholders in
close corporations must discharge their management and stockholder
responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard.
They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the
forms of relief for oppressive conduct such as appointing a receiver, granting a
buyout, and ordering the declaration of a dividend); Masinter v. Webco Co.,
262 S.E.2d 433, 441 & n.12 (W. Va. 1980) (listing ten possible forms of relief
for oppressive conduct such as ordering the reduction of excessive salaries and
issuing an injunction against further oppressive acts). But see Giannotti v.
Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (Va. 1990) (stating that the dissolution remedy
for oppression is "exclusive" and concluding that the trial court is not
permitted "to fashion other... equitable remedies").
36. Thompson, supra note 18, at 708; cf. Harry J. Haynsworth, The
Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close
Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 53 (1987) (finding that courts
ordered remedies other than dissolution in the majority of thirty-seven
involuntary dissolution cases studied). See generally Murdock, supra note 30,
at 461-64 (discussing the development of alternative remedies).
37. See 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.27, at 159 ("The
inclusion of 'oppression' and similar grounds as a basis for involuntary
dissolution or alternative remedies has opened up a much broader avenue of
relief for minority shareholders caught in a close corporation wracked with
dissension."); Thompson, supra note 18, at 708-09 ("[Ilt makes more sense to
view oppression not as a ground for dissolution, but as a remedy for
shareholder dissension.").
38. Thompson, supra note 18, at 726; see also id. at 739 ("It should not be
surprising that the direct cause of action is developed particularly in states
without an oppression statute, and [it] provides a vehicle for relief for minority
shareholders in a close corporation where the statutory norms reflect no
consideration for the special needs of such enterprises."). See generally





Following the lead of the Donahue court, several courts outside
of Massachusetts have also imposed an enhanced fiduciary
duty between the shareholders in a close corporation.0
The development of the statutory cause of action and the
enhanced fiduciary duty reflect "the same underlying concerns
for the position of minority shareholders, particularly in close
corporations after harmony no longer reigns."4' Because of the
similarities between the two remedial schemes, "it makes sense
to think of them as two manifestations of a minority
shareholder's cause of action for oppression.4 In the close
corporation context, therefore, one can view the parallel
development of the statutory cause of action and the enhanced
fiduciary duty action as two sides of the same coin-i.e., the
shareholder's cause of action for oppression.
C. MEASURING OPPRESSION THROUGH "REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS"
The development of a shareholder's cause of action for
oppression requires courts to determine when "oppressive"
conduct has occurred. In wrestling with this issue, the courts
have developed three principal approaches to defining
oppression. First, some courts define oppression as
39. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). The Donahue court, however, later
scaled back its duty of utmost good faith and loyalty. Due to concerns that the
"untempered application of the strict good faith standard enunciated in
Donahue ... will result in the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by
the controlling group in a close corporation which will unduly hamper its
effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best interests of all
concerned," the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court suggested a balancing
test in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976). If "the controlling group can demonstrate a 'legitimate business
purpose' for its action[s]," no breach of fiduciary duty will be found unless the
minority shareholder can demonstrate "that the same legitimate objective
could have been achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful
to the minority's interest." Id.
40. See Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1559 (W.D. Pa. 1984); W & W
Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 574 (lad. Ct. App. 1991); Evans v. Blesi,
345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167,
170-71 (Miss. 1989); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989); Estate
of Schroer v. Stamco Supply Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
41. Thompson, supra note 18, at 739.
42. Id. at 700; see id. at 738-45 (describing the "combined cause of action
for oppression").
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"burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct.., a visible
departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of
fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to
a company is entitled to rely." Second, some courts link
oppression to breach of an enhanced fiduciary duty owed from
one close corporation shareholder to another." Third, a
number of courts tie oppression to the "frustration of the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders." 5 Of these three
approaches, the "reasonable expectations" standard garners the
most approval, and courts have increasingly used it to
determine whether oppressive conduct has taken place.46 The
highest courts in several states have adopted the reasonable
expectations approach,47 and commentators have generally
43. Thompson, supra note 18, at 711-12 (alteration in original) (quoting
Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)); see, e.g.,
Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 629 P.2d 214, 221 (Mont. 1981); see also
Haynsworth, supra note 36, at 36-39 (describing judicial definitions of
oppression).
44. See, e.g., supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
45. 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.27, at 161; see In re Kemp &
Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (equating oppression with
conduct that "substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held by
minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular
enterprise").
46. See, e.g., 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.28, at 168 ("One of
the most significant trends in the law of close corporations in recent years is
the increasing willingness of courts to look to the reasonable expectations of
shareholders to determine whether 'oppression' or similar grounds exist as a
justification for involuntary dissolution or another remedy.").
47. See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985); Fox v. 7L
Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 933-34 (Mont. 1982); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634
A.2d 1019, 1029 (N.J. 1993); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173,
1179 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563-64 (N.C.
1983); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987); Masinter v.
Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 442 (W. Va. 1980). But see Kiriakides v. Atlas
Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 265-66 (S.C. 2001) ("We find [that]
adoption of the 'reasonable expectations' standard is inconsistent with [the
South Carolina oppression-triggered dissolution statute], which places an
emphasis not upon the minority's expectations but, rather, on the actions of
the majority."). A number of intermediate appellate courts in other states
have adopted the reasonable expectations standard as well. See Maschmeier
v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); McCauley
v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 237 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Davis v.
Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 382 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). In states without an
oppression-triggered dissolution statute, the reasonable expectations standard
has also been used to determine whether a breach of the enhanced fiduciary
duty has occurred. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (Mass. 1976); Merola v. Exergen Corp., 648 N.E.2d 1301,
1305 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). Finally, Minnesota and North Dakota have
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approved of the reasonable expectations standard.4
As mentioned, the New York Court of Appeals in Kemp has
been influential in its discussion of the reasonable expectations
approach 9 Unfortunately, by tying the expectations inquiry to
the time of investment, the Kemp court's framework causes
difficulty when changing expectations or non-investing
shareholders are at issue. Before exploring either of these
problems associated with the time of investment standard,
however, a context in which to think about the shareholder
oppression doctrine (and its accompanying reasonable
expectations inquiry) is needed. After all, without a sense of
what the shareholder oppression doctrine is attempting to
accomplish, it is difficult to think principly about how these
categories of cases should be handled.
II. THE INVESTMENT MODEL OF OPPRESSION
This Article contends that the shareholder oppression
doctrine aims to protect the fair value of the close corporation
shareholder's investment, including the specific components of
the shareholder's return on investment. This conception,
referred to in prior scholarship as the "investment model" of
oppression,55 generally finds oppression liability whenever
unjustifiable majority conduct harms any aspect of a
explicitly incorporated the reasonable expectations standard into their
dissolution statutes. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3)(a) (West Supp. 1999);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985).
48. See Haynsworth, supra note 36, at 37 ("The third definition of
oppression, initially derived from English case law, and long advocated by
Dean F. Hodge O'Neal as well as other leading close corporation experts, is
conduct which frustrates the reasonable expectations of the investors.");
Thompson, supra note 20, at 211 ("Recognition of the intimate, illiquid
relationship within a close corporation therefore provides the necessary
foundation for judging whether relief should be granted and, if so, what relief
is appropriate; the shareholders' reasonable expectations has become the
standard which best facilitates that approach.").
49. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
50. See generally Douglas Y. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment
at Will in the Close Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL.
L. REV. 517, 537-47 (developing the investment model of oppression and
arguing that shareholder oppression should be viewed as a doctrine that
protects the value of the close corporation shareholder's investment).
51. If the minority's misconduct or incompetence justifies the majority's
allegedly oppressive action, a finding of shareholder oppression is likely
unwarranted. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close




shareholder's expected investment return. This result is
typically derived from a determination that the shareholders
struck a bargain for the protection of these investment return
components when the minority committed its capital to the
venture, as well as from an accompanying conclusion that the
majority's subsequent actions have breached that bargain. 2 A
brief discussion of the absence of a market, the purpose of
involuntary dissolution statutes, and the rise of the buyout
remedy will help support the conception of oppression as an
investment-centered doctrine.
A. DERIVING THE INVESTMENT MODEL
1. The Absence of a Market
Understanding the shareholder oppression doctrine
requires an examination of the "special nature of close
corporations."53 That "special nature" stems primarily from the
lack of a market for close corporation shares.54 Indeed, if the
principle of majority rule harms the position of a public
corporation shareholder, the shareholder can exit the situation
by selling its holdings on the market. Because a "market exit"
generally protects the fair value of a public company
investment, a public corporation shareholder is adequately
safeguarded from oppressive majority conduct.5 6
52. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
53. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (noting that "to a
great extent, a definition of 'oppressive' depends on the special nature of close
corporations"); 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.28, at 169; see also
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ("The statutory concept
of oppressive conduct, and the broad and imprecise definitions of the term
given by the courts, is best understood by examining the nature and
characteristics of close corporations.").
54. See, e.g., Kleinberger, supra note 16, at 1149 (discussing the lack of a
market for close corporation stock and observing that "[more than any other
characteristic, this 'no exit' phenomenon has pushed the law into developing
special rules for shareholders in close corporations").
55. See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 2:15, at 38 (observing that "in a
public-issue corporation the sensitivity of management to the market price for
the stock and the fact that stock prices are highly responsive to corporate
earnings tend to assure the dissatisfied shareholder of a reasonable price
when he liquidates his investment through the market" (internal quotation
omitted)); id. (noting that "[iun a large public-issue corporation, a shareholder
who is dissatisfied with the way the business is being operated can sell his
stock at no great financial loss").
56. See RMBCA, supra note 22, § 14.34 cmt. 1 ("Shareholders of publicly-
traded firms are protected by their right to sell out if they are dissatisfied with
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In the close corporation context, however, there is no
market exit.57 Thus, the close corporation shareholder "faces a
potential danger that the shareholder of a public corporation
generally avoids-the possibility of harm to the fair value of the
shareholder's investment." 8  At its extreme, this harm
manifests itself as the classic freeze-out where the minority
shareholder faces a trapped investment 9 and an indefinite
exclusion from participation in the business returns.60  The
position of the close corporation shareholder, therefore, is
uniquely precarious. As one commentator noted, "[in no other
type of business arrangement do owners face the possibility of
completely losing their investments by being excluded from
employment and denied profits."61
If the "special nature" of close corporations informs the
meaning of oppression, the absence of a market should be
current management or they may seek traditional remedies for breach of
fiduciary duty."); Thompson, supra note 20, at 225 ("Once a corporation's
shares are publicly traded, minority shareholders, even if they are also
employees, are not subjected to the risks that are common to the close
corporation and which inspired the modern legislative and judicial remedies.");
id. at 237 (noting that the market offers public corporation shareholders
"protection" and an "exit option").
57. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
58. Moll, supra note 50, at 543.
59. See Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1027 (N.J. 1993) ("The
inability to reflect dissatisfaction by withdrawing one's investment places the
majority shareholder in an enhanced power position to use the minority's
investment without paying for it." (internal quotation omitted)); Balvik v.
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ("The limited market for stock in a
close corporation and the natural reluctance of potential investors t6 purchase
a noncontrolling interest in a close corporation that has been marked by
dissension can result in a minority shareholder's interest being held 'hostage'
by the controlling interest, and can lead to situations where the majority
'freeze out' minority shareholders by the use of oppressive tactics."); Sandra L.
Schlafge, Comment, Pedro v. Pedro: Consequences for Closely Held
Corporations and the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1071,
1076 (1992) ("The terminated minority shareholders' capital is, in effect, held
hostage by those in control of the corporation because there is no marketplace
in which minority shareholders may sell their shares.").
60. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
61. Schlafge, supra note 59, at 1074 n.19; see also Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 1, at 6 ("he position of the minority in the close corporation is as
unique as it is precarious: no other form of business organization subjects an
owner to the dual hazards of a complete loss of liquidity and an indefinite
exclusion from sharing in the profitability of the firm."); cf 1 CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 7.20, at 90 ("[IThe lack of a market for the
shares of a close corporation ... leaves a minority shareholder vulnerable in a




viewed as the motivating force behind the development of the
oppression doctrine in the close corporation setting.
2
Protecting the value of the close corporation shareholder's
investment, therefore, should be understood as the focus of the
shareholder oppression doctrine. The doctrine, in other words,
should approximate the role of the market in the public
corporation. Just as the market protects the value of the public
corporation shareholder's investment, the oppression doctrine
should protect the value of the close corporation shareholder's
investment.
2. The Purpose of Involuntary Dissolution Statutes
Examining "the Legislature's general purpose in
creating... involuntary-dissolution statute[s]" also helps to
give meaning to the oppression doctrine.6 As mentioned, the
dissolution statutes of many states include "oppression" as a
ground for involuntary dissolution of a corporation. 6 In the
Kemp decision, the court discussed the purpose behind the
legislature's inclusion of "oppressive actions" as an involuntary
dissolution ground:
As the stock of closely held corporations generally is not readily
salable, a minority shareholder at odds with management policies
may be without either a voice in protecting his or her interests or any
reasonable means of withdrawing his or her investment. This
predicament may fairly be considered the legislative concern
underlying the provision at issue in this case; inclusion of the criteria
that the corporation's stock not be traded on securities markets and
that the complaining shareholder be subject to oppressive actions
supports this conclusion.'
The language of the Kemp court strongly suggests that the
vulnerability of the close corporation investment provided the
primary motivation behind the inclusion of the "oppressive
actions" language in the involuntary dissolution statute. The
62. See supra note 54.
63. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984); see 2
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 9.28, at 169 (noting that "most courts
have come to recognize that [oppression and similar terms] can best be
construed against the background of the special nature of close corporations
and the legislative purpose in enacting involuntary dissolution statutes").
64. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
65. Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1180 ("The
purpose of this involuntary dissolution statute is to provide protection to the
minority shareholder whose reasonable expectations in undertaking the
venture have been frustrated and who has no adequate means of recovering
his or her investment.").
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purpose of the statute and the "oppressive actions" ground,
therefore, was to provide the shareholder's investment with
some protection in this vulnerable situation.6 To the extent
that the purpose of the statute gives meaning to the oppression
action, protecting the close corporation shareholder's
investment is central to the operation of the doctrine.
3. The Prevalence of the Buyout Remedy
Both legislatures and courts have authorized alternative
remedies for oppressive conduct that avoid actual dissolution of
the corporation.6 ' The most common alternative remedy is the
buyout of the oppressed investor's holdings.' The prevalence of
66. Indeed, dissolution aids the oppressed close corporation shareholder to
the extent that it provides a mechanism for recovering the value of the
shareholder's investment. The conventional dissolution proceeding
determines the value of a business and awards each stockholder its
proportionate share of that value. See Murdock, supra note 30, at 447-51
(discussing different valuation approaches to dissolution and their effect upon
the value of the minority shareholder's interest). A Kemp-like dissolution
statute, therefore, is designed to protect the value of a close corporation
shareholder's investment. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(b) (McKinney
2002) (stating that a court, "in determining whether to proceed with
involuntary dissolution... shall take into account.... [wihether liquidation
of the corporation is the only feasible means whereby the petitioners may
reasonably expect to obtain a fair return on their investment.... " (emphasis
added)); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) ("[I]n most instances the market place provides a
remedy for those shareholders who feel that they are being oppressed by a
large corporation, i.e., they can sell their stock. That remedy is not readily
available to minority shareholders in close corporations. The [oppression-
based dissolution] statute was designed therefore to solve a problem peculiar to
them." (emphasis added)).
67. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
68. See 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 1.16, at 97 (noting that
"buyouts are the most common remedy for dissension within a close
corporation"); Murdock, supra note 30, at 470 ('The most common form of
alternative remedy is the buy-out of the minority shareholder."); see also
Thompson, supra note 20, at 231 ("The increased use of buyouts as a
remedy... is the most dramatic recent change in legislative and judicial
thinking on close corporations problems.").
Support for the buyout remedy exists in half the states, although the
relevant statutes and judicial decisions differ in their operation. See
Thompson, supra note 18, at 718. Some states permit the corporation or the
shareholders to purchase the stock of a minority shareholder seeking
involuntary dissolution. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.630 (Michie 2000); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489 (West
2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(2) (West Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A.12-7(8) (West 1992); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney
Supp. 2001-2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (2001); RMBCA, supra note
22, § 14.34(a) (1994). In other states, statutes authorize a court to order a
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the buyout remedy in litigated cases supports the investment
model's conception of shareholder oppression as a protector of
the close corporation investment. By ordering a buyout of the
minority's interest at "fair value," 9 the courts effectively
buyout as one of several possible remedies in dissolution proceedings or in
other litigation between shareholders. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-
1816 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1123 (West 1992); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1994); MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORP.
Supp. §§ 41, 42 (1997). Courts have also ordered buyouts as part of their
general equitable authority. See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1560
(W.D. Pa. 1984); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 380, 383 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988); Thompson, supra note 18, at 720-21 ("Courts increasingly have ordered
buyouts of a shareholder's interest by the corporation or the other
shareholders even in the absence of specific statutory authorization."). The
buyout remedy is not limited to dissolution proceedings; indeed, in the absence
of a statute, courts have ordered buyouts after finding a breach of fiduciary
duty. See id. at 723. Even when the court has ordered a dissolution, the
parties will often agree on a buyout of one shareholder by another. See
Thompson, supra note 20, at 232. A study by Professors Hetherington &
Dooley indicated that in almost all cases of judicially ordered dissolution, the
parties came to a contractual solution rather than actually liquidating the
company. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at 46. The contractual
solution usually involved the buyout of a shareholder. See id.
69. The buyout statutes in several of the large commercial states use the
term "fair value." See Thompson, supra note 18, at 718 (noting that "[sleveral
of the largest commercial states permit a corporation or its majority
shareholders to avoid involuntary dissolution by purchasing the shares of the
petitioning shareholders at their 'fair value'"); see also RMBCA, supra note 22,
§ 14.34(a) ("In a proceeding under section 14.30(2) to dissolve a corporation...
the corporation may elect or, if it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may
elect to purchase all shares owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair
value of the shares." (emphasis added)). State statutes vary in their
definitions of fair value. New York has no definition at all. See N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW § 1118 (McKinney Supp. 2002); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486
N.Y.S.2d 341, 347 (App. Div. 1985) ("The statute [section 1118] does not define
the term 'fair value,' and it fails to provide any criteria for determining 'fair
value.'"). The California statute mentions liquidation value as of the valuation
date, but the same statute notes that the possibility of sale as a going concern
should be taken into account. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990).
Wisconsin defines fair value with reference to going concern value. See WIs.
STAT. § 180.1833 (1992); see also MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORP. SuPP. § 42(b)(1)
(1993) (stating that a court, if it orders a share purchase, should "determine
the fair value of the shares, considering among other relevant evidence the
going concern value of the corporation"). In several states, the buyout statute
refers to the state's appraisal statute as a guide in determining fair value.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:12-7(8)(c) (West Supp. 1998); cf RMBCA, supra note 22, § 14.34 cmt. 4
("Section 14.34 does not specify the components of 'fair value,' and the court
may find it useful to consider valuation methods that would be relevant to a
judicial appraisal of shares .... The two proceedings are not wholly
analogous, however, and the court should consider all relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case in determining fair value."). One
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replicate a market for close corporation minority interests and
allow oppressed shareholders to "cash out" of the business.
Because the buyout remedy seeks to provide the close
corporation shareholder with the "fair value" of his investment,
one can logically assume that the doctrine triggering the
remedy aims to protect the fair value of that investment.
In summary, the absence of a developed market, the
purpose of involuntary dissolution statutes, and the prevalence
of the buyout remedy all support a conception of oppression as
an investment-centered doctrine. Under this conception,
majority conduct that unjustifiably harms any aspect of the
minority's investment return results in liability for oppression.
B. THE COMPONENTS OF A CLOSE CORPORATION INVESTMENT
Although the investment model suggests that shareholder
oppression protects the value of the close corporation
investment, the question of how to define that investment still
remains. It is critical to understand that the components of a
close corporation investment generally differ from the
components of a public corporation investment. In a public
corporation, the shareholder commits its capital with the
expectation that its investment entitles the shareholder to a
proportionate share of the company's earnings.7 ' Accordingly,
the public corporation shareholder understands that its
investment return will consist solely of financial sums
reflecting this proportionate share (e.g., dividend payments).'
commentator noted that the reference to appraisal statutes "brings in a body
of case law on valuation, but the precedent is often so open-ended that it
provides little guidance." Thompson, supra note 20, at 233.
Despite these various articulations, the "fair value" of a close corporation
is most commonly derived by calculating investment value-a calculation
based typically upon the earnings of the corporation. See id. ("The most
common method for determining fair value is to calculate investment value,
usually based on the company's earnings."); id. ("[Tihe most commonly utilized
formula [for calculating investment value] treats company earnings as
determinant of investment value."); id. ("[Niet asset value and market value
are of little use in determining the fair value of an interest in an ongoing close
corporation; net asset value is generally used when an enterprise is
liquidating, and market value is not available because a close corporation [by
definition] lacks a market for its shares."); see, e.g., Taines v. Gene Barry One
Hour Photo Process, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 362, 366-67 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (rejecting
net asset value and market value as methods for close corporation valuation
proceedings).
70. A four percent shareholder, for example, expects that her investment
entitles her to four percent of the corporation's profits.
71. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 560
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Put differently, "[tihe shareholder of a publicly traded
corporation invests money... with a view to receiving money,
as opposed to steady employment or associational benefits, in
return."72 In a close corporation, however, the shareholder
typically commits its capital with the expectation that its
investment entitles the shareholder to employment and to a
management role, as well as to a proportionate share of the
company's earnings. 73 Thus, a close corporation shareholder
usually understands that the investment return will consist of
employment benefits, management participation, and financial
sums reflecting a share of the company's earnings. 74  The
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) ("Large corporations are usually formed as a
means of attracting capital through the sale of stock to investors, with no
expectation of participation in corporate management or employment. Profit
is expected through the payment of dividends or sale of stock at an
appreciated value."); Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in
the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary
Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 646, 663 (1992)
("The shareholder of a publicly traded corporation may realize a return on her
investment in either of two ways: directly, by a distribution of dividends, or
indirectly, by an increase in the market value of her shares.").
72. O'Neill, supra note 71, at 663; see also Schlafge, supra note 59, at 1073
n.14 (noting that the interest of the public corporation shareholder is "limited
to the amount of their dollar investment in their shares, which can be sold at
any time on the public market, and is not tied to their salary and other
employment benefits").
73. See Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 561 ("Unlike their counterparts in large
corporations, [close corporation minority shareholders] may expect to
participate in management or to influence operations, directly or indirectly,
formally or informally. Furthermore, there generally is an expectation on the
part of some participants that their interest is to be recognized in the form of a
salary derived from employment with the corporation." (citation omitted));
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ("[It is generally
understood that, in addition to supplying capital and labor to a contemplated
enterprise and expecting a fair return, parties comprising the ownership of a
close corporation expect to be actively involved in its management and
operation."); Schlafge, supra note 59, at 1077 n.29 ("Both [public corporation
and close corporation] investors expect appreciation in the value of their
investment. Investors in publicly held corporations receive dividends as a
form of return on this investment, while investors in closely held corporations
may expect to receive a salary and a management position as a condition of
their investment." (emphasis added)); see also Michaud v. Morris, 603 So. 2d
886, 888 (Ala. 1992) ("Certain basic expectations of investors are enforceable
in the courts, and among those is a right to share proportionally in corporate
gains."); Bahls, supra note 10, at 330 ("Shareholders in close corporations
expect proportional distribution of the earnings of the corporation while it is
operating."); supra note 19 and accompanying text; infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
74. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662
(Mass. 1976) ("The minority stockholder typically depends on his salary as the
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components of a close corporation investment, therefore, should
be viewed as much broader than those of a public corporation
investment. As a consequence, the shareholder oppression
doctrine must concern itself with protecting much more than
the investor's proportionate share in the success of the
75
company.
principal return on his investment...."); Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119,
124-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("[E]mployment is, of course, a frequent
and perfectly proper benefit of stockholders in a closet] corporation."); id. at
126 (noting that "the primary benefit that [the defendant close corporation
shareholder] receives from the corporation is continued employment for
himself and his family"); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311,
1319 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) ("A person who.., buys a minority
interest in a close corporation does so not only in the hope of enjoying an
increase in value of his stake in the business but for the assurance of
employment in the business in a managerial position."); Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 397 (Or. 1973) ("It is also true that the
Bakers, as stockholders, had a legitimate interest in the participation in
profits earned by the corporation."); 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, §
1.08, at 32 ("Even if shareholders in a close corporation anticipate an ultimate
profit from the sale of shares, they usually expect (or perhaps should expect) to
receive an immediate return in the form of salaries as officers or employees of
the corporation rather than in the form of dividends on their stock.");
Murdock, supra note 30, at 468 ("The courts have recognized the reality that
compensation paid to those in control has a two fold function: to recompense
services and to provide a return on investment."); Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward
a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
1099, 1110 (1999) (noting that a close corporation shareholder "often invests
for the purpose of having a job, and the salary and other benefits he receives
are conceived to be part of the return on his investment"); id. at 1109 ("In a
closely held corporation, a shareholder-employee has interests in his job and
stock that are often economically intertwined."); id. at 1110 ("[The discharge
of an employee in a closely held corporation usually involves appropriation of a
portion of his investment by the remaining shareholders."); Schlafge, supra
note 59, at 1094 ("Section 302A-751 [the Minnesota statute protecting
minority shareholders] recognizes that shareholders in a closely held
corporation legitimately expect a return of their investment, often in the form
of a management position and a salary."); supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
75. Cf. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 565 (N.C. 1983)
(rejecting an argument that a close corporation shareholder is entitled to relief
only when "traditional shareholder rights" have been infringed); id. ("While it
may be true that a shareholder in... a publicly held corporation may have
'rights or interests' defined as defendants argue, a shareholder's rights in a
closely held corporation may not necessarily be so narrowly defined.... Put
another way, [a close corporation shareholder's] 'reasonable expectations' are
not as limited as defendants contend.").
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C. THE ROLE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS WITHIN THE
INVESTMENT MODEL
As noted, the reasonable expectations standard for
measuring shareholder oppression has garnered the most
approval from courts and commentators. 76 In general, if the
majority's conduct frustrates the reasonable expectations of a
minority investor, the courts characterize the conduct as
"oppressive" and grant the minority shareholder relief.7
Under the investment model, the reasonable expectations
inquiry is used in a more tailored fashion. It attempts to
ascertain the benefits that the shareholder reasonably expected
to receive as a result of its investment in the business. Those
expected benefits represent the shareholder's expected return
on investment, and the oppression doctrine seeks to protect this
return as part of its effort to protect the fair value of the
shareholder's overall investment.78  The reasonable
expectations inquiry, in other words, attempts to link the
commitment of capital to certain expected benefits (e.g.,
employment, management) such that the benefits can be
characterized as part of the protected investment return. For
example, an inquiry into whether a shareholder reasonably
expected continued employment should be understood as an
inquiry into whether the shareholder reasonably expected that
its investment in the venture entitled it to continued
employment with the close corporation.79 If the shareholder did
have such a reasonable expectation, then a sufficient link exists
between the job and the investment such that the benefits of
continued employment can fairly be characterized as part of the
shareholder's expected investment return."O
76. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y.
1984) (defining "oppressive actions" as "conduct that substantially defeats the
'reasonable expectations' held by minority shareholders in committing their
capital to the particular enterprise").
78. See supra Part IIA (describing the investment model of oppression);
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179 ("A shareholder who reasonably
expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a
share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other
form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the
corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists no effective
means of salvaging the investment." (emphasis added)).
80. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664
(Mass. 1976) (noting that the action of the majority disregarded a
longstanding stockholder policy that "employment with the corporation would
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It is critical to observe, however, that a reasonable
expectation derives from shared understandings between the
investors in a close corporation."' Thus, a court should not
credit an asserted reasonable expectation unless the evidence
reveals that the majority and minority investors mutually
understood that a commitment of capital to the venture
entitled one to a particular benefit.82 Stated differently, a
go hand in hand with stock ownership"); Merola v. Exergen Corp., 648 N.E.2d
1301, 1304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (indicating that a fiduciary duty between
shareholders is not at issue unless there is a "nexus between the plaintiffs
investment of capital and his employment in the corporation"), rev'd, 668
N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1996); id. at 1305 ("All that is required is the express, or
reasonably understood, coupling of continuing employment with the
employee's investment in the equity securities of the corporation .... ").
81. See Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term
1984) ("M[The 'reasonable expectations' test is indeed an examination into the
spoken and unspoken understanding upon which the founders relied when
entering into the venture."); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563
(N.C. 1983) ("Only expectations embodied in understandings, express or
implied, among the participants should be recognized by the court."); Robblee
v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289, 1293 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) ("Reasonable
expectations' are those spoken and unspoken understandings on which the
founders of a venture rely when commencing the venture."); see also Kemp,
473 N.E.2d at 1179 ("A court considering a petition alleging oppressive
conduct must investigate what the majority shareholders knew, or should
have known, to be the petitioner's expectations in entering the particular
enterprise."); id. (noting that unfulfilled "subjective hopes and desires in
joining the venture" are insufficient to establish an oppression claim
(emphasis added)); Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563 ("Privately held expectations
which are not made known to the other participants are not 'reasonable.);
Bahls, supra note 10, at 322-23 n.229 ("[Clourts have been careful to protect
only those expectations of the minority known by and acquiesced to by the
majority."); Hillman, supra note 14, at 78 ("[Only expectations embodied in
understandings, express or implied, among the participants should be
recognized."); Robert W. Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 FLA. L. REV.
691, 728 (1985) (noting that relief may be warranted "[tlo the extent that a
minority shareholder had reasonable expectations at the inception of a
venture, those expectations were understood by other participants in the
enterprise, and the prospect that the expectations will be realized is remote");
Thompson, supra note 20, at 224 (observing that a reasonable expectations
standard is based "on the parties' understandings").
82. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 51, at 810 ("[The aggrieved shareholder
must offer evidence indicating that the stockholders shared a basic
understanding at the venture's inception of an entitlement to certain specific
benefits (e.g., employment, management participation) due to their
commitments of capital to the business."). It should be noted that, in many
cases, this evidentiary requirement will not be difficult to satisfy. Indeed, the
Author has previously stated the following:
In practice... any evidentiary "requirement" is loosely applied.
Although explicit evidence of mutual understandings between the
shareholders will occasionally be present-particularly where written
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reasonable expectation should only arise when the evidence
indicates that the shareholders have struck a bargain between
themselves-i.e., the minority has agreed to contribute capital
to the venture in return for the majority's promise to provide a
particular benefit.8 Under the investment model, therefore, a
reasonable expectation is simply a shorthand reference for a
bargain struck between the majority and minority shareholders
over an entitlement the minority is to receive in return for its
documents exist that spell out those understandings-such explicit
evidence is usually absent. Indeed, close corporations typically
operate on a more informal basis. As a consequence, generic
information reflecting the parties' actions and course of conduct is
often the only specific evidence of a reasonable expectation before the
court. When that evidence matches a pattern of behavior that occurs
in the typical close corporation, courts appear to be satisfied that a
reasonable expectation has been established.... For example, proof
(via testimony or otherwise) that the minority shareholder was a
company founder who served as an employee and a manager after his
or her initial investment satisfies many courts that the shareholder's
situation fits within the general pattern. Correspondingly, this proof
satisfies many courts that reasonable expectations of employment and
management have been established. This "specific evidence," of
course, is minimal, as it often reflects the undisputed facts of the case.
Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the
Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1006, 1009-10
(2001) [hereinafter Moll, Reasonable Expectations]. Nevertheless, in some
oppression disputes, the shareholder cannot proffer sufficient evidence. See,
e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996) (refusing to
find that a termination of a shareholder-employee was a breach of fiduciary
duty in part because "there was no general policy regarding stock ownership
and employment, and there was no evidence that any other stockholders had
expectations of continuing employment because they purchased stock").
83. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("These
reasonable expectations constitute the bargain of the parties in light of which
subsequent conduct must be appraised."); Sandra K. Miller, A Note on the
Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majoirty Shareholders: How Can the
Reasonable Expectation Standard be Reasonably Applied in Pennsylvania?, 12
J.L. & COM. 51, 54 (1992) (describing the reasonable expectations approach as
a "departure from the bargain struck by the majority and minority
shareholders"); cf. Bahls, supra note 10, at 321 ("Remedies fashioned to protect
expectations help insure that innocent shareholders will realize their
bargained-for benefit."); id. at 325 ("Because participation and rights in a
closely held corporation are normally negotiated, expectations are reasonable
when they provide a basis for the bargain."); Murdock, supra note 30, at 465
(noting that when applying the reasonable expectations standard, "the crux is
not identifying a traditional wrong but rather identifying the basis of the
bargain-what were the explicit or implicit conditions pursuant to which the
parties associated themselves together in the corporate form"); Ralph A.
Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close
Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 504 (1985) ("If a shareholder's
reasonable expectations have been frustrated, the shareholder has lost the
benefit of the original bargain.").
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commitment of capital.4 To say that majority conduct
frustrated a minority's reasonable expectation of employment,
therefore, is to say that the majority has broken the promise of
continued employment that was made to the minority in
exchange for its investment in the business.
m
D. THE INVESTMENT MODEL AND TBE "TIME OF INVESTMENT"
Focus
As the prior discussion has indicated, the shareholder
oppression doctrine can be viewed under the investment model
as a doctrine that seeks to enforce the "investment bargains"
struck between the majority and minority shareholders. The
function of the reasonable expectations inquiry, therefore, is to
identify these "investment bargains."
Under this rationale, a "time of investment" focus for
measuring reasonable expectations is consistent with the
theory of the investment model. After all, if the inquiry aims to
identify majority promises made in return for the minority's
investment, it is likely that most of the relevant promises will
be found at or before the time when the minority actually
contributes its capital to the business."' The time of the actual
investment, therefore, provides a useful reference point. In
84. See supra note 83.
85. An analogy to contract law is rather easily made. The exchange of the
majority's promise of employment or other entitlements for the minority's
contribution of capital reflects an offer and acceptance framework. The
minority's invested capital should suffice as consideration for the majority's
promises, see infra note 111 and accompanying text, and the contract is
presumably formed as soon as the minority's investment is made. Thus, when
the majority's actions "breach" this "contract" between the parties, oppression
liability would arise.
Despite this contract law analogy, the law of oppression and the law of
contracts "are more dissimilar in operation than they might appear." Moll,
Reasonable Expectations, supra note 82, at 995. Contract law "has the tools to
protect the close corporation shareholder," but "well-entrenched doctrinal
hurdles (e.g., indefiniteness, expectation damages) will likely prevent it from
doing so." Id. See generally id. at 1023-66 (explaining that contract law will
likely be unable to protect the reasonable expectations of close corporation
shareholders due to remedy limitations as well as problems associated with
indefiniteness, employment at will, and the statute of frauds).
86. Indeed, in most cases, the minority presumably contributes its capital
only after the majority makes satisfactory promises. If the majority fails to
make the desired promises, the minority will likely forego investing in the
company. See Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 82, at 1075 ("Simply
put, because the bargaining leverage at the outset favors the prospective
shareholder-employee, nothing compels the shareholder-employee to invest on
unfavorable terms.").
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theory, a court may only need to look backwards in time to
identify any relevant investment bargains between the
parties.87
A time of investment focus for assessing reasonable
expectations also works well in practice given the fact patterns
that typify the published oppression decisions. Many (if not
most) close corporation disputes involve participants who
invest in the company as founders and who expect an
employment position and a management role as a result of
their commitments of capital to the venture.8 In the typical
case, subsequent majority conduct unjustifiably interferes with
these employment and management expectations. 89 Thus,
87. Cf 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 7:15, at 91 (explaining that
"primary emphasis" should be "on the participants' original business bargain"
because "in a close corporation the most significant bargaining occurs at the
initial stage of the enterprise"); Thompson, supra note 20, at 218 (same). Of
course, if the need arises to look forward in time (i.e., post-investment) for
relevant investment bargains, a strict time of investment standard is
unhelpful. The investment model of oppression, however, is able to look post-
investment, as its search for investment bargains is not temporally limited.
See infra text accompanying notes 145-47. See generally Part IV infra
(discussing the investment model's ability to handle disputes involving
changing expectations).
88. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 658-61
(Mass. 1976); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361-62 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Balvik v.
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384-85, 388 (N.D. 1987); supra note 19 and
accompanying text; see also Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 82, at
1007 ("A noticeable pattern of behavior is observed in many (if not most) close
corporations-i.e., shareholders invest in the company (generally as founders
at the inception of the venture); they quit their prior jobs and immediately
begin working for the company and serving in a management role; and they
remain in employment and management positions unless dissension arises
between the majority and minority investors. Such a pattern implies that
typical close corporation shareholders invest with the expectation that their
investments entitle them to employment and management participation with
the company.").
89. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664 ("At a minimum, the duty of
utmost good faith and loyalty would demand that the majority consider that
their action was in disregard of a long-standing policy of the stockholders that
each would be a director of the corporation and that employment with the
corporation would go hand in hand with stock ownership .... "); Topper, 433
N.Y.S.2d at 362 ("Nor do the majority stockholders deny that,., they
discharged [the minority shareholder as an employee, terminated his
salary,... removed him as an officer... and changed the locks on the
corporate offices to exclude him."); Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 388 ("Balvik [the
minority shareholder] was ultimately fired as an employee of the corporation,
thus destroying the primary mode of return on his investment. Any slim hope
of gaining a return on his investment and remaining involved in the
operations of the business was dashed when Sylvester [the majority
shareholder] removed Balvik as a director and officer of the corporation."); see
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when aggrieved minority shareholders (who are often co-
founders of the business) assert that the majority has
frustrated their reasonable expectations of employment and
management participation, they are complaining about their
original expectations that motivated their decision to invest in
the venture. In other words, only "time of investment"
expectations are asserted in most of the published oppression
decisions. It is much less common for courts to be confronted
with expectations that allegedly arose after the time of
investment, expectations that allegedly changed since the time
of investment, or even participants who made no investment at
all in the company.
Thus, a time of investment standard for measuring
reasonable expectations-a standard that is consistent with the
investment model of oppression-adequately addresses the
typical oppression dispute that characterizes many of the
published opinions. 0 As the oppression doctrine develops
further, however, disputes centering around post-investment
expectations or non-investing shareholders are inevitable. As
mentioned, particularly with respect to non-investing
shareholders, such cases have already begun to arise.9' It is
important, therefore, to explore these atypical case categories
and to consider how they may be principally resolved. As will
be seen, insights gleaned from the investment model of
oppression will be quite helpful for these tasks.
III. THE PROBLEM OF CHANGING EXPECTATIONS
While it may be true that close corporation shareholders
strike protective investment bargains between themselves,
there is no reason to assume that the bargaining ceases for the
also Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 371, 387 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (noting the "ubiquitous pattern of other cases in which a minority
shareholder's employment is terminated from a company, salary and benefits
cease, and the shareholder is deprived of participation in management");
Joshua M. Henderson, Buyout Remedy for Oppressed Minority Shareholders,
47 S.C. L. REV. 195, 201 (1995) ("Cases in which courts have found oppressive
conduct on the part of majority shareholders frequently involve similar factual
circumstances. Typically, the complaining shareholder will claim that she has
been 'frozen out' or 'squeezed out' by the majority, which often means that the
shareholder's employment with the company has been terminated,
compensation (in the form of salary or dividends) has been cut off, and the
shareholder generally has been excluded from participating in the
management of the company.").
90. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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remainder of the business venture once the time of investment
has passed. Simply as a matter of common sense, the
shareholders' expectations may change over time due to
business developments or personal circumstances. 2 Stated in
the language of the investment model, it seems quite plausible
for changed circumstances to alter the nature of the
shareholder's investment such that "time of investment"
bargains become useless while new protective investment
bargains become necessary.
A. PREVENTING FREEZE-OUTS: A CORPORATE LAW BASIS FOR
ENFORCING POST-INVESTMENT EXPECTATIONS
If the law does not enforce expectations that develop after
a shareholder's investment in a close corporation, majority
action could harm or eliminate vital components of a
shareholder's investment return. This potential for minority
shareholder abuse-shareholders being "frozen-out" from the
returns of the venture while their investments are "locked-in"
to the company9 -is what motivated corporate law to respond
92. See Hillman, supra note 14, at 85-86 (noting that "[bloth participants
and expectations change"); Sandra Y. Miller, Should the Definition of
Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of
Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 227, 254 (1993)
(providing an example of a close corporation where the business priorities of
the shareholders change over a fifteen-year period); Miller, supra note 83, at
74 (same); Thompson, supra note 20, at 219 ("[E]xpectations of participants in
close corporations continue to evolve over the course of the life of the
enterprise, and courts should give protection to these expectations as they
have developed."); see also Bahls, supra note 10, at 325 ("Courts should...
examine the relationship between the parties since the inception of the
business to ascertain whether the understandings of the parties have changed
over time. If so, then it is likely that the reasonable expectations of the parties
have also changed." (footnote omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 30, at 430-31 ("If the employment of a
shareholder were terminated, a classic case of being 'frozen-out,' yet 'locked-
in,' would exist. The shareholder would be frozen-out of any participation in
the earnings of the corporation since no dividends would be paid and no
compensation would be earned. The shareholder would be locked-in since his
capital investment would be held by the corporation with the shareholder
having neither a right to withdraw nor a ready market for sale of his shares."
(footnotes omitted)); cf Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1027 (N.J. 1993)
(describing a close corporation minority shareholder as "powerless within [the]
corporation, as well as powerless to leave [it]"); Bostock v. High Tech Elevator
Indus., 616 A.2d 1314, 1320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("As a
consequence, a shareholder challenging the majority in a close[] corporation
finds himself on the horns of a dilemma; he can neither profitably leave nor
safely stay with the corporation.").
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with the shareholder oppression doctrine in the first place.94 To
the extent that corporate law seeks to prevent this type of
freeze-out conduct from occurring, it would presumably seek to
protect the parties' mutual understandings-i.e., the parties'
reasonable expectations 5 -no matter when they developed.
For example, assume that two investors form a close
corporation. The majority investor contributes $20,000 to the
business while the minority investor contributes $10,000. Both
shareholders agree to serve on the company's board of directors
but, at the time of the founding of the business, only the
majority investor quits her prior employment position to work
full-time in the new venture. The minority investor keeps his
job and chooses not to work in the new company. One year
later, however, the minority investor leaves his job and, with
the majority shareholder's approval, commences full-time
employment with the close corporation. Assume that the
minority works competently for the close corporation for the
next ten years until dissension arises between the majority and
minority investors. Ultimately, the majority unjustifiably
terminates the minority's employment.
If the law measures reasonable expectations at the time of
investment, the minority arguably has no reasonable
expectation of employment. After all, it seems likely that his
capital was not given in return for a promise of continued
employment because, at the time of investment, he had no need
for employment with the company. Put differently, it is quite
possible that the minority did not bargain for employment
94. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14
(Mass. 1975) ("The minority is vulnerable to a variety of oppressive devices,
termed 'freeze-outs,' which the majority may employ.... [Wihen these types of
'freeze-outs' are attempted by the majority stockholders, the minority
stockholders, cut off from all corporation-related revenues, must either suffer
their losses or seek a buyer for their shares.... At this point, the true plight
of the minority stockholder in a close corporation becomes manifest. He
cannot easily reclaim his capital."); id. at 515 ("Because of the fundamental
resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership, the trust and
confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the
inherent danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that
stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one
another." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,
473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) ("The purpose of this involuntary
dissolution statute is to provide protection to the minority shareholder whose
reasonable expectations in undertaking the venture have been frustrated and
who has no adequate means of recovering his or her investment.").
95. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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protection at the time he committed his capital to the venture
because he neither desired nor foresaw close corporation
employment at that point.
96
After working for the company for ten years, however, it is
not a stretch to argue that the minority's employment has
become part of his expected return on investment. For ten
years, the minority has received the definitive benefits of a
close corporation salary97 as well as the intangible benefits of
working for oneself. 8 Assuming that the company has paid no
96. It is possible, of course, that the minority did have a reasonable
expectation of employment at the time of investment simply because the
majority received employment with the company as a result of her investment
in the venture. Put differently, the majority and minority shareholders may
have reached a mutual understanding that investment in the company did
entitle one to employment, although that employment did not have to
commence until the shareholder desired it.
97. See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 3:07, at 70 n.6 (noting that "the
special prerogatives enjoyed by a majority in a close corporation not
infrequently block the sale of a close corporation because the majority has
difficulty obtaining such lucrative employment elsewhere" (citing J.C.
Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close
Corporation, 1969 ILL. L.F. 1, 20 n.72)); SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING A
BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIEs 121
(3d ed. 1996) ("It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful
closely held company earning a greater amount in annual compensation than
the amount an equivalent nonowner employee would earn as compensation.");
Ragazzo, supra note 74, at 1109 ("The shareholder may invest for the purpose
of having a job that produces higher compensation than could be garnered
through employment by third parties."); see also Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d
119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("[Wlhile there is no claim that the
[close corporation] salaries are excessive, neither was there a showing that if
the 'inside' employment were terminated those family members could earn as
much elsewhere."); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tenn. 1997)
(noting that the annual compensation of a shareholder-employee of a
commercial printing business "was in excess of $250,000").
98. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319
(N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (noting "the challenge, the independence,
the prestige, the feeling of achievement, and the other intangible benefits of
being part of the management of a successfully run small company"); Bahls,
supra note 10, at 290-91 (noting that close corporation ownership includes "the
social status and challenge of operating one's own company and the
satisfaction of providing employment to one's children"); id. at 319 n.212
(mentioning the "loss of satisfaction and other qualitative perks associated
with operating a business"); O'Neill, supra note 71, at 668 (describing the
"psychological payoffs" that an "owner-manager" anticipates as a result of
investing in a venture, including "the pleasure of being one's own boss, the
feeling of satisfaction in creating a viable enterprise and even the excitement
of taking a substantial risk"); Ragazzo, supra note 74, at 1110 ("Additionally,
the employee may simply derive satisfaction from working in a business that
he himself takes a substantial part in managing."); cf Bonavita, 692 A.2d at
124 ("[A] job in the family business probably provides considerably more
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dividends, 99 those employment benefits are apt to be the only
return on investment that the minority has received.' 0 More
importantly, given that the majority's return on investment has
also been limited to these employment benefits, the majority
likely shares the minority's understanding that employment is
critical and that the employment benefits have become a
primary component of the minority's investment return.1' To
allow the majority to violate this understanding-an
understanding that the majority presumably would not violate
for herself 02 -simply because the minority's need for company
employment developed after the time of investment seems
rather arbitrary, particularly where additional evidence exists
that links a company investment to company employment (e.g.,
all of the other shareholders work full-time for the company,
security than one might find in other employment.").
99. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661,
663 n.13 (Mass. 1976) (involving a minority shareholder who was terminated
from employment and removed from management in a company that did not
pay dividends); In re Burack, 524 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459-60 (App. Div. 1988)
(same); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (same); see also
Silling v. Erwin, 881 F. Supp. 236, 238 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (observing that a
close corporation "never -declared a dividend in its forty-five year history");
Bonavita, 692 A.2d at 125 ("Absent employment.., the normal corporate
benefit which one... might expect would be the payment of dividends. This
corporation, however, pays no dividends."); In re Schlachter, 546 N.Y.S.2d 891,
892 (App. Div. 1989) ("[The record reveals that the corporations have never
paid any dividends."); In re Smith, 546 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (App. Div. 1989)
("[Als is commonil with closely held corporations, no policy of declaring
dividends appeared to exist."); F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing
Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 887 (1978) (noting
that it is "usually the case" that a close corporation pays no dividends).
100. See, e.g., supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 51, at 817 ("[Alt the outset of the venture,
attaching primary importance to the 'individual' investment components (e.g.,
employment, management participation) rather than to the 'enterprise'
investment component (e.g., corporate profitability) is normally consistent
with the majority's interests as well. After all, the typical majority
shareholder has often left prior employment herself to join the speculative
start-up business."); cf. Bonavita, 692 A.2d at 124 ("It is also clear that Alan
Corbo [the controlling shareholder] recognized that such continued
employment was indeed a substantial benefit. When Gerald Bonavita [the
non-controlling shareholder] presented what he claimed was a chance to sell
the entire business for a handsome price, Alan Corbo responded by insisting
that an essential condition of any such sale must be the ability of his three
sons and himself to continue their employment with the new corporate
owner.").
102. Cf. Moll, supra note 51, at 817-18 ("Of course, it is hard to imagine the
majority shareholder firing herself to benefit the corporation.").
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the company distributes profits in the form of salaries and
bonuses, or a general policy exists regarding stock ownership
and employment). °3
Moreover, allowing the majority to violate this post-
investment understanding effectively results in a freeze-out,
just as if the minority had reasonably expected employment
from the outset. Indeed, even if the minority retains his
position on the board, the loss of a job in combination with the
absence of dividends typically means that the minority is cut
off from the financial returns of the business and, often
correspondingly, from the minority's primary source of
livelihood." 5 Even though the expectation of employment was
not held at the time of investment, the freeze-out harm is the
same. As a consequence, it seems overly formalistic to argue
103. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Mass. 1996)
(suggesting that a company investment was not tied to company employment
because "there was no general policy regarding stock ownership and
employment,... there was no evidence that any other stockholders had
expectations of continuing employment because they purchased stock... [and]
there was no evidence that the corporation distributed all profits to
shareholders in the form of salaries").
104. Close corporations often distribute their corporate earnings through
salary and other job-related benefits rather than through the declaration of
dividends. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. When a stockholder is
terminated from employment, therefore, the stockholder may be cut off from
her proportionate share of the corporate earnings. See Nagy v. Riblet Prods.
Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Many closely held firms endeavor to
show no profits (to minimize their taxes) and to distribute the real economic
returns of the business to the investors as salary. When firms are organized
in this way, firing an employee is little different from canceling his shares."
(emphasis added)); Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. Ct.
1986) ("In a close corporation, since dividends are often provided by means of
salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be the functional equivalent of the
denial of participation in dividends."); supra note 29 and accompanying text.
105. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass.
1975) ("Typically, the minority stockholder in a close corporation has a
substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation. The
stockholder may have anticipated that his salary from his position with the
corporation would be his livelihood." (citation omitted)); Muellenberg v. Bikon
Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1385 (N.J. 1996) (noting that participation in the
business is the "principal source of employment and income" for many close
corporation shareholders); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178
(N.Y. 1984) (noting that a shareholder's "participation in [a close] corporation
is often his principal or sole source of income"); 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, §
1:03, at 4 ("[A close corporation shareholder] may put practically everything he
owns into the business and expect to support himself from the salary he
receives as a key employee of the company. Whenever a shareholder is
deprived of employment by the corporation... he may be in effect deprived of
his principal means of livelihood.").
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that the oppression doctrine would protect a minority
shareholder who began working for the company at the time of
his actual commitment of capital, but would not protect that
same shareholder if he began working for the company one
year after his investment was made.0 6 As long as the minority
can prove that he reached an explicit or implicit understanding
of employment with the majority, that understanding should be
enforced."7
Stated in investment model language, one can argue that
the bargain struck between the shareholders in the above-
mentioned fact pattern has been modified. While the
minority's investment was not initially linked to company
employment because he did not contribute capital in return for
the majority's promise of employment, the majority and
minority have both come to understand that the minority's
employment is now an integral part of his investment. Because
corporate law seeks to regulate freeze-out conduct in the close
corporation context-whenever that conduct may occur l'0 -that
mutual understanding should be enforced as a modified
bargain (i.e., a reasonable expectation) of its own.
B. RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: A CONTRACT LAW BASIS FOR
ENFORCING POST-INVESTMENT EXPECTATIONS
Aside from corporate law's desire to combat freeze-outs,
contract law also provides a ground for enforcing post-
investment expectations. This Article has already suggested
that a post-investment expectation could be enforced as a
modification to the shareholders' original "time of investment"
bargain.1 9 Technically, however, a modification under contract
106. It is worth repeating that this hypothetical involves a shareholder
who later became an employee of the company and asserted a reasonable
expectation of employment. It is different from a scenario where an employee
subsequently becomes a shareholder and asserts a reasonable expectation of
employment. See, e.g., 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 3:06, at 50 (noting that
the shareholder oppression doctrine is unlikely to be applied "when the
employment relationship dominates the shareholder relationship, for example
where the individual was an employee before becoming a shareholder").
107. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 14, at 86 ("here may be situations ...
in which the parties reevaluate their expectations and reach new
understandings which provide the basis for continued participation in the
venture, and under such circumstances application of the [reasonable
expectations] approach would be appropriate."); supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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law requires additional consideration to be enforceable.1
While the minority's original commitment of capital surely
counts as consideration for the majority's initial promises,"' it
is unclear whether, in the typical close corporation dispute, any
subsequent consideration will be present to support an alleged
post-investment modification. After all, merely continuing to
remain involved with the company as an employee or manager
will not usually suffice as new consideration,"2 and additional
commitments of capital by the minority will not often be
present.13  From the standpoint of contract law, therefore, it
may be difficult to enforce post-investment expectations as
modifications."4 As a consequence, one could argue that
110. See JOHN D. CALAMARi & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 5-14, at 262 (3d ed. 1987) ("[Alccording to the majority of cases,
under the pre-existing duty rule an enforceable agreement to modify a
contract requires consideration on both sides."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 4.21, at 276 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that a modification was
unenforceable because "there was no consideration for the new promise"). But
see U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (2000) ("An agreement modifying a contract [for the sale
of goods] within this Article needs no consideration to be binding."); infra note
149 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1321
(N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (observing that, for typical close
corporation minority shareholders, "there is consideration which would
support an implied understanding that, at least, the majority owner will not
discharge him arbitrarily or in bad faith and without some legitimate business
reason"); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (Grady, J.,
concurring) ("I would hold that the $70,000 in equity contributions made to
the corporation by Gigax constitute consideration for his employment in
addition to the services he provided, taking the relationship outside the 'at-
will' definition....").
112. Cf 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.27, at 77 (2d
ed. 1999) ("If an employee provides consideration beyond performing duties
under the employment contract, then the presumption of employment at will
may be rebutted. Merely continuing to work in the same employment
relationship is not sufficient." (footnote omitted)); id. § 1.27, at 78 ("It has been
held that an employer may unilaterally modify an employee handbook only if
it contains a reservation of the right to do so. Without such a reservation of
right, additional consideration is required, and the employee's continuing to
work for the employer will not suffice as the consideration."); id. § 1.27, at 77
("As a general rule, services and obligations associated with beginning new
employment will not be considered sufficient additional consideration to
override the presumption of at-will employment. Thus, moving to another
city, resigning from a former position or job, or foregoing other employment or
ceasing to search for other employment are not sufficient consideration to alter
at-will status." (footnotes omitted)).
113. But see Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 558,
562 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (involving a minority shareholder who
co-signed a note and apparently made additional capital contributions).
114. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, however, consideration is not
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minority shareholder protections are limited to expectations
established at the time of the minority's investment-i.e., at
the time of "contract" formation when the minority arguably
"accepted" the majority's "offer" of benefits by providing
consideration." 5
It is important to note, however, that the above discussion
is premised on a traditional conception of contracts as "discrete
transactions"-transactions "of short duration, involving
limited personal interactions, and with precise party
measurements of easily measured objects of exchange."
Paradigmatic examples of discrete contracts are one-time
exchanges where the "parties need never deal with each other
again,""7 such as a sale of gasoline from a stranger while on a
roadtrip,"8 or the purchase of a bottle of wine from a store
while visiting a foreign country."9  In such discrete
transactions, "the complete future of the deal, to the extent that
it has any at all, is 'presentiated12--that is, the parties bring
the future wholly into the present and treat it as present
through complete planning of the transaction, planning which
required to render a modification of an agreement enforceable. See infra note
149 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 85.
116. Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of
Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 764 (1998) (quoting IAN R. MACNEIL,
CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 12 (2d ed. 1978)).
117. Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case
Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 392 (1986);
see also Ian Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60
VA. L. REV. 589, 594 (1974) (describing a discrete transaction by stating that
"[t]he two strangers expect to have nothing to do with each other between now
and sundown, they expect never to see each other again thereafter, and each
has as much feeling for the other as has a Viking trading with a Saxon.").
118. See Linzer, supra note 117, at 391 ("[Professor Ian] Macneil has
argued that the traditional contract model is of a 'discrete transaction,' his
paradigm being a cash sale of gasoline between strangers on the Jersey
Turnpike.").
119. See Gudel, supra note 116, at 764; see also Macneil, supra note 117, at
594 (providing an example of two strangers involved in the purchase and sale
of a horse).
120. The term "presentiation," as it relates to contract law, is generally
attributed to Professor Ian Macneil. As one commentator noted,
"Presentiation" is a rare, largely theological term meaning to treat
future circumstance as happening in the present.... Macneil uses it
in a slightly different sense, emphasizing that traditional contract
theory requires most if not all aspects of relationships (franchises,
employment, even supplier-customer dealings) that develop and
evolve over many years to be focused in the moment of contracting.
Linzer, supra note 117, at 392-93 n.338.
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then binds the parties."21  As this comment suggests, the
moment of contract formation is critical to the discrete
contracts model given that the terms established at the time of
the contract's formation will serve, from that point forward, as
the governing "rules" for the parties' interactions.1 22  The
observations of one commentator underscore this point:
[I]n the "classical" (i.e., Williston) and 'neo-classical" (i.e., Corbin)
models of contract, the parties must address all [their] needs,
consciously and consensually, at the moment the contract is made.
All future contingencies must be drawn back to the present-they
must be "presentiated." The parties must deal with changes after the
moment of contracting by later mutual agreement, or else the courts
must use the cumbersome devices of excuse, such as for mistake or
impracticability. Otherwise the terms presentiated at the time of
contracting, perhaps years in the past, must govern. m
In contrast to the view of contracts as discrete exchanges,
many transactions "involve long-term dealings between parties
who continue to have contact with each other over the years"
and whose needs "will change with external circumstances.' 24
Such "relational contracts" 125 are typified "by long duration,
121. Gudel, supra note 116, at 764.
122. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
123. Linzer, supra note 117, at 392-93 (footnotes omitted); see A
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 92 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995) ('[Cllassical'
contract law requires that all the terms be expressed (and consented to) at the
moment of contracting."); Gudel, supra note 116, at 767 (observing that
classical contract law is criticized for "its attempt to locate the entire content
of the parties' agreement, and thus the entire source of their obligation to one
another, in an initial moment of agreement which contracts treatises describe
as the 'meeting of the minds'); Linzer, supra note 117, at 393 n.338
("[Traditional contract theory requires most if not all aspects of relationships
(franchises, employment, even supplier-customer dealings) that develop and
evolve over many years to be focused in the moment of contracting."); Danton
B. Rice & Michael A. Schlueter, Note, Deregulation and Natural Gas Purchase
Contracts: Examination Through Neoclassical and Relational Contract
Theories, 25 WASHBuRN L.J. 43, 62 (1985) ("Neoclassical contract law has only
partially freed economic exchanges from the classical goals of discreteness and
presentiation. These goals demand adherence to an overall structure founded
on full consent at the time the contract is made."); cf. Gudel, supra note 116, at
766 ("[TIhe doctrines of what are called classical and neo-classical contract law
are largely based on the assumption that all contracts are discrete."); Rice &
Schlueter, supra, at 59 ("In American neoclassical contract law, the basic
proposition remains that planning governs contractual relations despite
changed circumstances which make the transaction undesirable to one of the
parties.").
124. Linzer, supra note 117, at 392.
125. Professor Ian Macneil has been described as "the contracts scholar
most responsible for the concept of relational contract." Gudel, supra note
116, at 763-64; see also A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 123, at 91
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personal involvement by the parties and the exchange, at least
in part, of things difficult to monetize or otherwise measure. 126
Common examples of relational contract arrangements include
marriage, employment, franchises, and professional
partnerships. With relational contracts, "the participants
never intend or expect to see the whole future of the relation as
presentiated at any single time, but view the relation as an
ongoing integration of behavior to grow and vary with events in
a largely unforeseeable future.""2 Rather than bind the parties
("Macneil is best known for his 'relational' theory of contract."); Linzer, supra
note 117, at 391 (observing that Professor Macneil "has applied a relational
interests approach to contracts"). For samples of Macneil's work, see Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854
(1978) [hereinafter Macneil, Long-Term Economic Relations]; Ian R. Macneil,
Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483;
Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974)
[hereinafter Macneil, Many Futures]; and Macneil, supra note 117, at 589.
126. Gudel, supra note 116, at 765; see also A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY,
supra note 123, at 92 (describing "relational" or "intertwined" dealings as
"long-term, and involving people who get to know one another and whose
futures are bound together by their dealings"); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 33, at 67 (3d ed. 1990) ("A relational contract is one
of relatively long duration."); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) ("A contract is
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive
obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain future
conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations
adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in
advance."); Macneil, Long-Term Economic Relations, supra note 125, at 900
(describing relational contracts as "more complex and of greater duration");
Rice & Schlueter, supra note 123, at 52 n.90 (noting "a tendency to equate the
term 'relational contract' with long-term contractual involvements"); cf
MURRAY, supra, § 33, at 68 (describing discrete transactions as those of "short
duration, limited interpersonal relationships, and easily measured
objectifications of exchange").
127. See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 116, at 765 ("[Tloward the relational end of
the exchange spectrum we find such things as franchise arrangements, long-
term employment, professional partnerships, labor/management relations and,
quintessentially, marriage."); Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 125, at 725
(citing marriage and employment as examples of relational arrangements).
128. IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND
RELATIONS 13 (2d ed. 1978); see MURRAY, supra note 126, § 33, at 67 ("Many
changes in that relationship may occur over a period of time, and these
changes cannot be presentiated and brought into the present at the time the
contract is formed."); id. § 33, at 68 ("At the opposite end of the spectrum we
find long-term relationships such as the employment contract involving the
engineer and the large corporation. This agreement presents difficult
problems in measuring performance and numerous entangling possibilities
that cannot be projected with definiteness and accuracy at the time of contract
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to the terms established at the time of the formation of the
contract, a relational contract approach "permit[s] the rights
and duties of the parties to be openly adjusted during the
relationship."
129
Significantly, the investment bargains entered into by close
corporation shareholders reflect the characteristics of relational
contracts.1 30  The typical employment and management
bargains that majority and minority shareholders strike, for
example, can be described as long-term arrangements, as they
usually have no definitive termination points. 3' In addition,
the very nature of employment and management bargains
requires the ongoing personal involvement of the parties.'32
formation."); see also A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY, supra note 123, at 92 ("In
long-term relational dealings the parties cannot possibly anticipate every
problem; they expect to have to work things out as the months or years go
by."); Gudel, supra note 116, at 786 ("Relational Contract Theory teaches that
when committing to a relation, we cannot specify all the obligations and
responsibilities that relation will entail.").
129. Linzer, supra note 117, at 393; see also Gudel, supra note 116, at 765
("[Pilanning for relational contracts is often tentative rather than entirely
binding....-).
130. Cf O'Neill, supra note 71, at 659 ("The contract among shareholders
and managers of a corporation is a long-term, relational contract, rather than
a discrete transaction.").
131. Indeed, close corporation investors generally expect continuous
employment and management participation. See Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) ("A guaranty of
employment with the corporation may have been one of the basic reason(s)
why a minority owner has invested capital in the firm." (internal quotation
omitted)); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) ("[Ihe
primary expectations of minority shareholders include an active voice in
management of the corporation and input as an employee."); In re Kemp &
Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) ("As a matter of fact,
providing employment for himself may have been the principal reason why he
participated in organizing the corporation." (internal quotation omitted)); In re
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (App. Div. 1985)
("Although the exact amount of the capital contribution is disputed, petitioner
utilized his own funds in getting this new venture underway, not simply as an
investment, but to provide employment and a future for himself."); Thompson,
supra note 18, at 702 (noting that close corporation shareholders "usually
expect employment and a meaningful role in management" (footnotes
omitted)); Alyse J. Ferraro, Note, Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.: The
Battle Between Ownership and Employment in the Close Corporation, 8
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 193, 215 (1990) ("As the majority emphasizes, Ingle was
compensated for the sale of his shares, but to believe that the dollar amount
received met his expectations would be to dismiss his purpose in acquiring
those shares. Ingle had reasonably expected his employment to continue until
he chose to retire or to acquire his own Ford dealership .... ").
132. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557 (N.C. 1983)
(stating that "[an organizational structure of this nature [i.e., a close
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Promises of continued employment and management
participation, moreover, are quite difficult to monetize due to
the intangible benefits associated with close corporation
employment and management positions.ln Finally, as
participants in a developing enterprise, close corporation
investors cannot foresee all of the contingencies that may arise
in the business and in their interactions with each other134 In
corporation]-in which the investment interests are interwoven with
continuous, often daily, interaction among the principals-necessarily requires
substantial trust among the individuals" (emphasis added) (internal quotation
omitted)); ef. 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 6, § 7.02, at 4 ("Ownership
and management frequently coalesce in closely held corporations, where not
uncommonly all the principal shareholders devote full time to corporate
affairs. Even where one or two shareholders may be inactive, the business is
normally conducted by the others without aid from nonshareholder
managers."); Kleinberger, supra note 16, at 1148 (noting that, in close
corporations, "most, if not all, of the shareholders are active in the
corporation's day-t-day business"); Thompson, supra note 18, at 702
(observing that "a more intimate and intense relationship exists between
capital and labor" in a close corporation).
133. See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 3:07, at 67 (referring to the
"prestige, privileges, and patronage that come from controlling a corporation
and occupying its principal offices"); id. § 3:06, at 47 ("[Llosing the prestige of
a directorship may be of considerable consequence to the shareholder."); supra
note 98 and accompanying text (noting the intangible benefits of working for
oneself in a close corporation); cf Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 407 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("A man or a woman... does
not enter into employment solely for the money; a job is status, reputation, a
way of defining one's self-worth and worth in the community."); id. at 415
(Kaufinan, J., dissenting) ("One's work obviously involves more than just
earning a living. It defines for many people their identity, their sense of self-
worth, their sense of belonging.").
134. See William Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination
Costs, Control Premiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 59-60
(1987) ("Investors in closely held enterprises are likely to be subject to
conditions of bounded rationality, under which they either fail to perceive the
complete set of problems that may occur later, or underestimate the
probability of their occurrence."); Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close
Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 129, 139
(1987) (stating that "inadequately planned close corporations will always
remain part of the picture," and noting that "[t]he most careful plan may fail
to visualize some conflicts, even if it does not generate novel ones of its own");
Thompson, supra note 18, at 705 ("Investors often fail to anticipate the failure
of their enterprise, or demonstrate an overly optimistic trust in those with
whom they are undertaking the venture."); cf O'Neill, supra note 71, at 659
("[Tihe contract [among shareholders and managers of a corporation] is
necessarily incomplete; the parties cannot engage in explicit bargaining over
many aspects of their interaction because they cannot foresee every possible
contingency that might befall their venture."); Thompson, supra note 20, at
224 ("Parties entering into a business relationship are not always willing to
fully explore the ramifications of possible disputes if things were to go
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fact, there is no guarantee that the business will even survive,
let alone succeed. 13  In short, all of the relational contract traits
are present in the investment bargains struck between typical
close corporation shareholders.
136
When thinking about close corporations and changing
reasonable expectations, therefore, the relational notion of an
"open adjustment" of the parties' obligations is significant. 137
Indeed, the notion provides a theoretical basis for the
propositions that the parties' understandings and bargains can
change over time, and that such changes can be enforced
without the need to satisfy all of the formalities of contract law
wrong.").
135. As one commentator observed,
Businesses start and fail in the United States at an increasingly
staggering rate. Every year, over a million people in this country
start a business of some sort. Statistics tell us that by the end of the
first year at least 40 percent of them will be out of business. Within
five years, more than 80 percent of them... will have failed....
[More than 80 percent of the small businesses that survive the first
five years fail in the second five.
MICHAEL E. GERBER, THE E-MYXTH REVISITED: WHY MOST SMALL BUSINESSES
DON'T WORK AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 2 (1995) (footnote omitted); see also
id. (noting that "hundreds of thousands of people every year... pour their
energy and capital-and life-into starting a small business and fail," and
stating that "many others... struggle along for years simply trying to
survive"); 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 1:04, at 8 (describing close
corporations as "small business enterprises"); U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE
ANN. REP. ON SMALL Bus. AND COMPETITION 29 (1997) ("Fewer than half of all
new firms are in operation after five years."); O'Neill, supra note 71, at 668
n.84 ("The risk of failure of the small business enterprise is notoriously high.");
Ragazzo, supra note 74, at 1109 ("Small businesses are exceedingly risky
enterprises with high failure rates.").
136. Both courts and commentators have looked to partnership principles
in close corporation disputes due to the similarities between the two business
structures. See Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. Spec.
Term 1984) ("It is frequently said that the relationship between the founders
of a close corporation approximates that between partners."); Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d at 557 ("[Ihe commentators all appear to agree that [c]lose
corporations are often little more than incorporated partnerships." (internal
quotation omitted)); text accompanying note 39; see also Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV.
271, 297 (1986) ("That closely held corporations are really 'incorporated
partnerships' is a common refrain."); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 1, at
2 (observing that a close corporation is the "functional equivalent" of a
partnership). To the extent that the partnership and the close corporation are
seen as analogous, it is worth noting that the professional partnership is often
cited as an example of a relational contract arrangement. See supra note 127
and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying note 129.
2002] SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
(e.g., additional consideration for modifications). 38 Similarly,
relational contract theory embraces the notion that the terms
established at the time of the making of the contract-i.e., at
the time of the minority shareholder's investment-are not
forever set in stone." 9  In a relational arrangement, party
conduct can be evidence of changing terms in a contract.'4 0
Oppression courts have focused on the conduct of the
participants to determine that initial reasonable expectations
138. See, e.g., HENRY H. PERRiTr, JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.7 (3d ed. 1992), available at WL JW-EPDIS § 4.7 ("Under the
relational theory, the parties expect that the terms of their relationship will
evolve. There is no need for formalities to validate new practices in order to
make those practices part of the contract."). As Professor Macneil observed,
The most important processes used for maintaining flexibility are
those of exchange itself, whether the sharply focused bargaining
characteristic of labor contract renewals or the subtle interplays of
day-to-day activities, or a host of other forms taken by exchange.
These patterns of exchange take place against the power and
normative positions in which the parties find themselves. This means
that exchange patterns occur, inter alia, against the background of
the discrete and presentiated aspects of the relations, whether those
aspects were created by explicit prior planning, other existential
circumstances, or combinations thereof. This requires harmonization
of changes with such a status quo but does not require doctrines such
as the doctrine of consideration....
Macneil, Long-Term Economic Relations, supra note 125, at 889-90 (emphasis
added); cf PERRITT, supra, § 4.7, available at WL JW-EMPDIS § 4.7
("Consideration obviously is a reflection of the reciprocity norm identified in
the relational contract literature. But the reciprocity norm in relational
contracts is more flexible than the traditional consideration concept. The
parties deal with each other in the context of a relationship. That is enough to
give validity to the commitments they make to each other.").
139. See, e.g., PERRrI, supra note 138, § 4.7, available at WL JW-EMPDIS
§ 4.7 ("Under the relational theory, obligations are not frozen in an initial
bargain. They evolve over time as circumstances change, guided by norms of
the particular community within which the relation exists."); Gudel, supra
note 116, at 769 (noting that relational contract theory suggests that "there is
no simple 'intent of the parties" and that "the parties themselves are
continually engaged in 'rewriting the contract"); id. (observing that
"Relational Contract Theory suggests that obligations evolve in the course of
long-term relations," and noting that "contractual obligations cannot always
be derived from an originary act of initial agreement"); cf. id. ("[A] legal
approach which looks back to intent at the moment of initial agreement in
effect does rewrite the contract by ignoring the reality of the parties' developed
relation.").
140. See, e.g., PERRITr, supra note 138, § 4.7, available at WL JW-EMPDIS
§ 4.7 ("Treating party conduct as reflecting terms of a[n] evolving contract is a
highly relational approach."); see also id. (noting that under relational theory,
"[slimply doing something becomes part of the contractual relationship (if it is
unobjectionable), more strongly so the longer it continues").
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exist,14' and courts could use a similar approach in analyzing
whether post-investment expectations have been established.
For example, recall the shareholder who began working for the
close corporation one year after investing and who was
terminated after ten years of employment.' Assume further
that the company distributed its profits in the form of salaries
and bonuses during the shareholder's ten years of working for
the business, and that all of the close corporation shareholders
worked full-time for the company during this period. It seems
fair to assert that, in combination, the duration of employment,
the use of employment as the vehicle for distributing the
corporate returns, and the prevalence of shareholder-employee
participants signify that the relation between the majority and
the minority has evolved to the point where employment has
become part of their investment bargain.43  As one
commentator noted,
Under the relational theory, the parties expect that the terms of
their relationship will evolve. There is no need for formalities to
validate new practices in order to make those practices part of the
contract. Simply doing something becomes part of the contractual
relationship (if it is unobjectionable), more strongly so the longer it
continues.... The parties deal with each other in the context of a
relationship. That is enough to give validity to the commitments they
141. See Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1388 (N.J. 1996) ("In
this case, it is reasonable to conclude that Burg's fair expectations were that
should he give up his prior employment with a competitor company and enter
this small corporation, he would enjoy an important position in the
management affairs of the corporation."); In re Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal
Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (App. Div. 1985) ("As a result of their long
history of taking an active part in the running of the corporation, petitioners
demonstrated that they had a reasonable expectation that they would
continue to be employed by the company, and have input into its
management."); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987) ("Balvik
quit his former job to join Sylvester in the new business enterprise, making a
relatively substantial investment in the process. It is apparent from the
record that Balvik's involvement with [the business] constituted his primary,
if not sole, source of livelihood and that he quite reasonably expected to be
actively involved in the operations of the business."); see also In re Topper, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("The parties' full understanding may not
even be in writing but may have to be construed from their actions."); Moll,
Reasonable Expectations, supra note 82, at 1008 ("[Many courts use this
course of conduct-investment, followed by company employment and
management--to aid their conclusion that reasonable expectations of
employment and management existed."); Thompson, supra note 20, at 217
("Expectations... must be gleaned from the parties' actions as well as their
written documents.").
142. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
143. See supra notes 103, 141 and accompanying text.
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make to each other.'44
Rather than conceptualizing the investment bargains struck
between close corporation shareholders as "discrete
transactions," therefore, conceiving of the investment bargains
as relational in nature provides a contract law basis for
enforcing post-investment expectations that develop between
the parties.
It is important to recognize that the investment model of
oppression is consistent with a relational conception of close
corporation investment bargains. The investment model does
primarily look to the time of the minority's investment as the
focal point of the shareholders' bargaining. In contrast to the
Kemp "time of investment" standard, however, nothing
constrains the model from looking beyond that point as the
relationship between the majority and the minority develops.
As mentioned, the model seeks to enforce the promises that the
majority made to the minority in return for the minority's
commitment of capital to the venture.'46 Those promises,
however, can be made both before and after the time of the
minority's actual investment. For example, assume that a
majority shareholder promises an active management role to a
prospective minority shareholder before the minority actually
invests. The minority then contributes its capital to the
company. Some time later, the majority also promises
continued employment to the minority. The promise of an
active management role was made in return for the minority's
investment to the extent that the promise induced the
minority's commitment of capital to the venture. One could
argue, however, that the post-investment promise of
employment was also given "in return for" the minority's
investment-not because the promise induced the investment
(it was a promise made after the minority's contribution of
capital), but because the majority and minority have reached a
mutual understanding that shareholder status in the company
entitles one to employment.
144. PERRI, supra note 138, at § 4.7, available at WL JW-EMPDIS § 4.7.
145. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
147. Assume, for example, that the shareholders' original deal provided
benefit "A" and benefit "B" to the minority if the minority invested. After the
minority's actual contribution of capital, however, the shareholders also agree
that benefit "C" will be provided because of the investment. The investment
model would enforce the agreements for all three benefits.
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In summary, both corporate law's desire to prevent freeze-
outs and contract law's acceptance of relational arrangements
support the proposition that post-investment expectations are
valid and deserving of protection. A reasonable expectations
framework that focuses solely on the time of investment,
therefore, is overly restrictive. Instead, as the investment
model conveys, the framework should explicitly adopt a broader
perspective that looks for investment bargains between the
shareholders throughout the entirety of their relationship."'
In addition, this discussion has suggested that post-
investment expectations can be enforced without the provision
of additional consideration. As relational contract theory
teaches, such an assertion is far from radical. Even under the
Uniform Commercial Code-a more "traditional" source of
contract law-a modification needs no consideration to be
binding.149  Because the majority can easily abuse the
148. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) (noting
that reasonable expectations "are to be ascertained by examining the entire
history of the participants' relationship," including "the 'reasonable
expectations' created at the inception of the participants' relationship; those
'reasonable expectations' as altered over time; and the 'reasonable
expectations' which develop as the participants engage in a course of dealing
in conducting the affairs of the corporation"); 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra
note 6, § 9.28, at 173 (articulating a broader standard that looks to the
shareholders' reasonable expectations "as they existed at the inception of the
enterprise, and as they developed thereafter through a course of dealing");
Allen B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders:
A Model for Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1064 (1969) ("In evaluating what
could reasonably be expected by the minority, the court must examine the
history of the relationship between the parties."); O'Neal, supra note 99, at 886
( The reasonable expectations of the shareholders, as they exist at the
inception of the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter through a course of
dealing concurred in by all of them, is perhaps the most reliable guide to a just
solution of a dispute among shareholders, at least a dispute among
shareholders in the typical close corporation.").
Although some courts have already adopted a broader reasonable
expectations standard, see, e.g., Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563, such courts
typically lack a coherent framework for explaining how and why the broader
standard should apply in the contexts discussed in this Article. The
investment model of oppression, however, provides such a coherent framework
that can handle changing expectations and non-investing shareholder
disputes. As a consequence, the rationales and justifications discussed in this
Article are useful even to these more "progressive" courts.
149. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (2000) ("An agreement modifying a contract [for
the sale of goods] within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.");
see also U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (2000) (noting that express warranties must be
"part of the basis of the bargain," but observing that post-contract assurances
can also become warranties even in the absence of additional consideration);
id. at cmt. 7 ("If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when the
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relationship between shareholders in a close corporation,"" and
because the minority relies, often for its livelihood, on the
implicit and explicit understandings that it reaches with the
majority,"' it is the existence of a mutual understanding itself
that merits the protection of the oppression doctrine. 2
Majority shareholders should recognize, therefore, that their
promises, informal policies, or course of dealing with the
stockholders can suggest that an understanding or bargain has
been reached with a minority investor. If the majority's actions
violate such an understanding or bargain, the oppression
doctrine can be triggered on that basis alone.
IV. THE PUZZLE OF THE 'NON-INVESTING"
SHAREHOLDER
As mentioned, the Kemp standard of measuring reasonable
expectations at the time of investment does not explicitly
account for close corporation shareholders who have made no
contribution of capital to the company. On the surface, of
course, the investment model of oppression also has difficulty
handling these shareholders. After all, the model relies upon a
conception of a prospective minority shareholder bargaining
with a majority shareholder over entitlements the minority is
buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional assurance), the
warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by consideration
if it is otherwise reasonable and in order.").
150. See supra notes 23-31, 104-05 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 81-82, 105 and accompanying text.
152. This framework is similar to a claim of promissory estoppel. The
promissory estoppel doctrine can enforce a promise even without the provision
of consideration if the promisee relied on the promise, the promisor had reason
to expect the reliance, and the avoidance of injustice can occur only by
enforcing the promise. See Litle v. Waters, No. CIV.A.12155, 1992 WL 25758,
at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 1992) (observing that "promissory estoppel...
operates as a substitution for consideration."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90 (1979); FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, § 2.19, at 95 ("First,
there must have been a promise. Second, the promisor must have had reason
to expect reliance on the promise. Third, the promise must have induced such
reliance. Fourth, the circumstances must have been such that injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."). As mentioned, the close
corporation minority shareholder relies on the understandings that it reaches
with the majority; the majority has reason to expect such reliance given that it
too is dependent on, for example, employment benefits; and the failure to
enforce such understandings often results in the injustice of a freeze-out. See




to receive in return for its investment.5 3 When assessing the
rights of a minority shareholder who did not actually contribute
capital, however, that shareholder has made no investment
over which to bargain. TM
In theory, the law could take a number of positions in
dealing with non-investing shareholders. The oppression
doctrine could find (1) that non-investing shareholders are not
entitled to any specific reasonable expectations at all; (2) that
non-investing shareholders are entitled to specific reasonable
expectations, but only to the specific reasonable expectations of
their investing transferors; or (3) that non-investing
shareholders are entitled to any specific reasonable
expectations that can be proven. Each of these positions will be
explored in turn. As a preliminary matter, however, it is
necessary to understand the differences between "general"
reasonable expectations and "specific" reasonable expectations.
A. "GENERAL" AND "SPECIFIC" REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
At bottom, the shareholder oppression doctrine protects
close corporation shareholders with a set of special judicial
rules that go beyond the protections provided generally by
public corporations law." An important corollary to this
153. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
154. A person receiving stock via gift, inheritance, or operation of law can
loosely be described as an "involuntary" shareholder of a close corporation.
The investment model contemplates the typical investor who voluntarily
chooses whether or not to become a shareholder in the venture. If the
minority can strike a satisfactory bargain for benefits with the majority, the
minority invests and becomes a shareholder. If a satisfactory bargain is not
struck, the minority withholds its capital and forgoes becoming a shareholder.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (observing that a minority
shareholder is not compelled to invest on unfavorable terms). In contrast,
non-investing shareholders are not given the opportunity to make this
threshold choice, as they become shareholders in the close corporation
"involuntarily" through the investment decision of others. See, e.g.,
Meiselman v. Meiselnan, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558-59 (N.C. 1983) ("[When a
minority shareholder receives his shares in a close corporation from another in
the form of a gift or inheritance.., the minority shareholder never had the
opportunity to negotiate for any sort of protection with respect to the
'reasonable expectations' he had or hoped to enjoy in the close corporation.");
Bahls, supra note 10, at 326 (observing that non-investing shareholders
"usually do not bargain for the terms of their participation in the business").
As mentioned, however, that "involuntary" description is used loosely,
particularly because an intended recipient can decline even a gift or an
inheritance of stock. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, § 10.3, at 683
(noting that "a donee of a gift can refuse the gift").
155. Under public corporation rules, courts rarely interfere with
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proposition, however, is that close corporation shareholders do
not lose any of the protections provided by general corporate
law-i.e., at a minimum, they receive the baseline public
corporation protections. In a public corporation, of course, the
employment, management, and dividend decisions, as the business judgment
rule is often invoked to protect the majority's discretion. See, e.g., Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) ("[Clourts
fairly consistently have been disinclined to interfere in those facets of internal
corporate operations, such as the selection and retention or dismissal of
officers, directors and employees, which essentially involve management
decisions subject to the principle of majority control."); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass. 1975) ("ITihe plaintiff will find
difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies. Such policies are
considered to be within the judgment of the directors." (footnote omitted));
Peeples, supra note 83, at 469 ("'The declaration of dividends is always at the
discretion of the board of directors. The business judgment rule protects such
a decision." (footnote omitted)); id. at 477 (Ihe hiring, firing, and
compensation of employees are ultimately board decisions and have always
qualified as management decisions protected by the business judgment rule.");
Ragazzo, supra note 74, at 1125 n.126 ("The business judgment rule is seldom
overcome on dividend questions."). When these matters are challenged in the
close corporation context, however, courts subject the majority's decisions to
greater scrutiny than a business judgment rule approach. See Smith v. Atl.
Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (stating, in a close
corporation dispute, that "[tihe judgment... necessarily disregards the
general judicial reluctance to interfere with a corporation's dividend policy
ordinarily based upon the business judgment of its directors"); Fox v. 7L Bar
Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 935 (Mont. 1982) ("When it is also considered that in
close corporations dividend withholding may be used by controlling
shareholders to force out minority shareholders, the traditional judicial
restraint in interfering with corporate dividend policy cannot be justified."
(citation omitted)); Grato v. Grato, 639 A.2d 390, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) (noting that 'judicial consideration of a claim of majority oppression
or freeze-out in a closely held corporation is guided by considerations broader
than those espoused in defendants' version of the 'business judgment rule");
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979) ("mhe statutory language embodies a legislative
determination that freeze-out maneuvers in close corporations constitute an
abuse of corporate power. Traditional principles of corporate law, such as the
business judgment rule, have failed to curb this abuse. Consequently, actions
of close corporations that conform with these principles cannot be immune
from scrutiny."); ONeill, supra note 71, at 692 ("The burden-shifting scheme
devised in Wilkes [a close corporation decision] effectively deprives majority
shareholders of the protection of the business judgment rule by requiring close
judicial scrutiny of the majority's action whenever the minority is harmed.");
id. at 690 ("Courts in some jurisdictions have refused to apply the business
judgment rule to close corporations in an effort to correct the squeeze out
problem."). But see Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993)
(noting, in a close corporation dispute, that "the court is hesitant to overturn
the corporation's valued exercise of its business judgment," and observing that
"[tihe Chancery Division properly concluded that it could not second-guess the
corporation's exercise of its business-judgment").
2002]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:717
mere status of "shareholder" entitles one to a proportionate
stake in the company's earnings156 as well as to various other
rights.'57 Significantly, these entitlements and rights are
provided regardless of whether the shareholder actually
committed its own capital to the business.'58 One can assert,
therefore, that every shareholder-whether in a public
corporation or a close corporation-reasonably expects that its
position as a stockholder entitles it to a proportionate share of
the company's profits.'59 Whenever this "general" reasonable
expectation is frustrated in a close corporation-i.e., "whenever
controlling shareholders squeeze-out a minority shareholder
from the business returns but continue to share in the
corporate earnings themselves" 6 -- oppression liability should
arise.
As mentioned, however, a proportionate share of the
company's earnings is only one component of the typical close
corporation shareholder's investment. Indeed, unlike in a
public corporation, the investment return in a close corporation
156. See Michaud v. Morris, 603 So. 2d 886, 888 (Ala. 1992) ("Certain basic
expectations of investors are enforceable in the courts, and among those is a
right to share proportionally in corporate gains."); Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 397 (Or. 1973) ("It is also true that the Bakers, as
stockholders, had a legitimate interest in the participation in profits earned by
the corporation."); Hillman, supra note 14, at 79 n.248 ("Obviously, an
individual commits capital to a venture with the expectation that a return will
be forthcoming, either through an appreciation in the value of his holdings or,
more typically for a close corporation, through a distribution of corporate
earnings."); supra note 70.
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1998) (detailing the inspection
rights available to "[alny stockholder"); id. § 251(c) (describing the right of
"stockholders" to vote on mergers or consolidations); Meiselman v. Meiselman,
307 S.E.2d 551, 565 (N.C. 1983) (listing the following as examples of
"traditional rights and remedies to which shareholders have been entitled":
right to receive notice of shareholder's meetings, right to cumulative voting,
right to examine books and records, and right to compel payment of
dividends); see also Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 82, at 1026
("Just as in a public corporation, of course, the status of 'shareholder' entitles
an investor to such benefits as a proportionate share of the corporate earnings
(e.g., a proportionate share of the dividends, if declared), a right to any stock
appreciation, a right to inspect company books and records (with a proper
purpose), a right to vote on shareholder issues, and a right to be recognized as
a shareholder.").
158. A person who received a 25% stake in a company as a gift, for
example, is entitled to 25% of the corporation's profits, even if the giftee did
not contribute any of its own capital to the business. See infra text
accompanying note 192.
159. See supra notes 70-74, 156-58 and accompanying text.
160. Moll, supra note 50, at 553.
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often includes employment and management benefits as well.'61
"Specific" reasonable expectations refer to these "extra"
components of the close corporation shareholder's investment
return--"extra" to the extent that they are in addition to the
stockholder's entitlement to a proportionate share of the
company's earnings. In investment model language, a specific
reasonable expectation refers to an individually tailored
investment bargain between a majority shareholder and a
particular minority shareholder for employment, management,
or some other benefit-a benefit beyond a proportionate stake
in the company's earnings-that the minority shareholder will
receive in return for its commitment of capital. 6 ' Thus, unlike
a status-triggered general reasonable expectation, a specific
reasonable expectation is not held by every close corporation
participant who can be characterized as a "shareholder." To
the contrary, a specific reasonable expectation is personal in
nature,163 as it requires proof that a close corporation majority
shareholder and a particular minority shareholder reached a
mutual understanding about a certain entitlement the minority
is to receive in return for its investment in the business. By
safeguarding specific reasonable expectations of employment,
management, or other entitlement, the oppression doctrine is
offering special protection to close corporation shareholders-
"special" to the extent that public corporation shareholders do
not receive similar protection.'6
B. POSITION ONE: No SPECIFIC REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
It may be too strong to assert that the Kemp standard does
not account for non-investing close corporation shareholders, or
that the investment model of oppression has difficulty handling
this group. Both frameworks may very well cover non-
investing shareholders, and both may reach the rather simple
conclusion that such shareholders are not entitled to any
161. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
163. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. To some extent, of course,
the public corporation shareholder does not need any "special" protection.
After all, public corporation shareholders invest only with the general
reasonable expectation that their investment entitles them to a proportionate
share of the company's earnings. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying
text. For this limited interest, a market exit provides adequate protection.
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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specific reasonable expectations at all.165 Simply put, when a
shareholder does not make a capital contribution, there is no
"time of investment" peculiar to that shareholder for measuring
reasonable expectations. Similarly, there is no investment in
return for which majority promises of benefits might have been
made. Stated differently, by not committing any capital, one
can argue that the non-investing minority shareholder has
failed to strike an investment bargain with the majority that
can be protected as a specific reasonable expectation.
Even if such a position is credited, it is important to
understand that the oppression doctrine will still protect non-
investing stockholders' general expectations of proportionately
sharing in the company's earnings. In some instances of
oppressive conduct, this protection will suffice: For example,
assume that three equal investors operate a close corporation.
All three shareholders own the same class of stock with
identical rights and privileges. Assume further that two of the
three shareholders ("the controlling block") invested their own
capital in the business at the time they joined the venture. The
other shareholder, however, received her stock as a gift and
has contributed no financial capital of her own to the
enterprise. All of the investors work for the company and serve
in management positions. For purposes of the hypothetical,
assume that the reasonable value of the labor services
performed by each shareholder for the corporation is $40,000.
Rather than pay dividends, the shareholders agree that the
company will distribute all profits on the basis of share
ownership as salary and other employment-related benefits. 66
Over the years, assume that company profits average
approximately $150,000 annually. Such a profit figure results
in a $50,000 annual "salary" or "bonus" payment to each
shareholder. Assume that this arrangement works well for
several years until dissension arises between the controlling
block and the "giftee" minority. As a result of the dissension,
the controlling block unjustifiably terminates the giftee's
employment. Upon termination, the giftee no longer receives
the salary and other employment-related benefits that the
165. Such a conclusion conveys, of course, that these shareholders will not
receive the special "specific expectations" protections of the oppression
doctrine. See supra Part IV.A (discussing general and specific reasonable
expectations).
166. From a tax standpoint, such an agreement is advantageous. See
supra note 28 (discussing the double taxation of dividend payments).
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remaining shareholders continue to earn. Nevertheless, the
company adheres to its policy of not paying dividends.
In this scenario, it is important to understand that the
actions of the controlling block have frustrated the giftee
minority's general expectation of sharing proportionately in the
corporate earnings. The facts indicate that only a portion of the
salaries and bonuses paid to the shareholders ($40,000)
represents compensation for the actual labor services that they
perform for the venture. The remaining amounts received by
the shareholders ($10,000) are "de facto" dividends-
distributions of company profit disguised as salary and other
employment-related compensation.6 7  When all three
stockholders shared proportionately in these de facto dividends,
their general expectations were being met. By terminating the
giftee minority and continuing to pay de facto dividends to
itself, however, the controlling block has effectively excluded
the giftee from her proportionate share of the business
returns.'6 Indeed, it is functionally equivalent to the
167. To the extent that a shareholder's salary and job-related benefits
exceed the value of the actual labor services provided by the shareholder to the
corporation, the excess compensation is often referred to as a "de facto
dividend." The term refers to the fact that the excess compensation actually
represents a distribution of corporate profit that is disguised, for tax reasons,
as compensation for labor services. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 30, at 468
(observing that employed shareholders can receive "de facto dividends"
through salary); id. ("The courts have recognized the reality that
compensation paid to those in control has a two fold function: to recompense
services and to provide a return on investment."); supra note 28. In this
hypothetical, for example, the facts indicate that the reasonable value of the
labor services performed by the shareholders is $40,000. When the company
earns $150,000 in profits, however, each shareholder receives employment
compensation totaling $50,000. In actuality, therefore, that $50,000 figure
includes (1) $40,000 as compensation for the actual labor services provided to
the company, and (2) $10,000 as a distribution of profit that is disguised as
employment-related compensation. See also Ferber v. Am. Lamp Corp., 469
A.2d 1046, 1049 (Pa. 1983) ("When the trial court has determined an amount
that would have been reasonable compensation for Harry, Isadore, and
Joseph's services to the corporations, if amounts in excess of that amount,
either in salaries or other benefits were paid, those excess amounts shall be
treated as profits which were distributed to the three brothers and shall be
used, along with other excess payments (i.e., auto, boat and entertainment
payments which have already been determined to be non-business related), to
calculate the amount which is to be distributed to Ms. Ferber as her share of
profits.").
168. See, e.g., Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996)
("Many closely held firms endeavor to show no profits (to minimize their taxes)
and to distribute the real economic returns of the business to the investors as
salary. When firms are organized in this way, firing an employee is little
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controlling block choosing to declare a dividend only for itself.
Where all of the shareholders own the same class of stock with
identical rights and privileges (as is the case here), such a non-
uniform declaration is impermissible, as dividends should be
paid proportionately to all stockholders in the class on the basis
of their share ownership.'69 Simply put, unless the terminated
giftee is included in the profit-distribution scheme of the
company, her general expectation of sharing proportionately in
the company earnings will be frustrated.' 70 As a consequence,
oppression liability will arise.
As this hypothetical illustrates, the oppression doctrine's
enforcement of general reasonable expectations would protect
the terminated giftee to the extent that she is complaining
about her exclusion from company profits that the other
shareholders are continuing to receive. 17' Thus, she can
different from canceling his shares." (emphasis added)); Landorf v. Glottstein,
500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("In a close corporation, since dividends
are often provided by means of salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be
the functional equivalent of the denial of participation in dividends."); see also
Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("When
defendants terminated the salary payments that had been made to Gerald
Bonavita, they had an obligation to provide, or at least try to provide, some
alternative benefit to the holder of the Bonavita stock. They were not free
simply to ignore those interests and operate the corporation for the sole
benefit of [the controlling shareholder]."); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473
N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) (involving a close corporation that, after two
shareholders ceased working for the company, oppressively changed its policy
of distributing earnings from one based on share ownership to one based on
services rendered to the corporation: "It was not unreasonable for the fact
finder to have determined that this change in policy amounted to nothing less
than an attempt to exclude petitioners from gaining any return on their
investment through the mere recharacterization of distributions of corporate
income.").
169. See Moll, supra note 50, at 539 n.92 ("If the majority shareholder pays
a dividend to himself but not to the minority shareholder, the payment is
generally illegal unless there is an explicit provision in the articles of
incorporation or the bylaws that permits such an unequal distribution.").
170. See Michaud v. Morris, 603 So. 2d 886, 888 (Ala. 1992) ("Shareholders
in close corporations have a right to share in corporation earnings, and a
majority cannot deprive such shareholders of that right by failing to declare
dividends or otherwise manipulating corporate earnings to squeeze out
minority interests."); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041,
1991 WL 65320, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) ("We believe [that]
when those in control of a closely held corporation terminate the employment
of a moving shareholder, a good faith effort must be made to buy-out the
shareholder at a fair price or [to] adjust the income distribution mechanism to
insure the shareholder an equitable investment return.").
171. The oppression doctrine would presumably require the controlling
block to include the terminated shareholder in the earnings-distribution
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challenge the loss of her job as oppressive on general
expectation grounds. 72 To the extent that the terminated giftee
is complaining about the loss of the benefits of the close
corporation job itself (e.g., loss of a higher-paying position, loss
of prestige, lost ability to work for oneself),73 however, she is
complaining about benefits beyond her entitlement to a
proportionate stake in the company's earnings. As mentioned,
the oppression doctrine protects such "extra" benefits only if a
specific reasonable expectation for that benefit exists. 74 Of
course, if one takes the position that non-investing
shareholders are not entitled to any specific reasonable
expectations, the terminated giftee's protection will not extend
this far. Thus, she cannot challenge the loss of her job as
oppressive on specific expectation grounds.
Even if non-investing shareholders are not entitled to any
specific reasonable expectations, therefore, they will still
receive some protection under the oppression doctrine via their
general reasonable expectations. Although non-investing
scheme of the corporation or, alternatively, to buy out the terminated
shareholder's holdings. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1021
(Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1984) ("While his [a terminated shareholder who
embezzled from the company] past misdeeds provided sufficient justification
for the majority's acts to date, there is a limit to what he can be forced to bear,
and that limit has been reached. The other shareholders need not allow him
to return to employment with the corporation, but they must by some means
allow him to share in the profits." (emphasis added)).
172. Assume, however, that after the controlling block terminated the
giftee minority's employment (and therefore cut the minority off from de facto
dividends), the controlling block started paying the minority a "true" dividend
in the amount of her proportionate share of the company's earnings. What the
giftee used to receive as a de facto dividend, in other words, she now receives
as a "true" dividend. In such circumstances, it is important to recognize that
the giftee's general reasonable expectation is satisfied. See supra notes 170-71
and accompanying text. Although the vehicle for distributing the corporate
earnings has changed (from salary to true dividend payments), the giftee is
still receiving her proportionate share of the company's profits. Under these
facts, she cannot challenge the loss of her job as oppressive on general
expectation grounds. Cf Bahls, supra note 10, at 326 ("Assume, for example,
that after one minority shareholder dies, the majority shareholders stop
dividend payments to all shareholders and instead pay above market salaries
to the family. In this situation, the court could order payment of dividends to
the minority shareholders.").
173. It is not uncommon for close corporation positions to pay a higher
salary and to carry more prestige than comparable jobs available outside of
the close corporation. See supra notes 97, 133 and accompanying text.
Moreover, close corporation positions often provide intangible "be your own
boss" value. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63; infra note 187.
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shareholders could not challenge terminations of employment
or removal from management positions as oppressive in and of
themselves, they could challenge such actions as oppressive to
the extent that they deny the shareholders their proportionate
share of the company's earnings.
C. POSITION TWO: ONLY THE SPECIFIC REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF THE INVESTING TRANSFEROR
In dealing with non-investing shareholders, the oppression
doctrine could take the alternative position that such
shareholders are entitled to specific reasonable expectations,
but only to the specific reasonable expectations of their
investing transferors. A company founder who reasonably
expected employment and management participation, for
example, could pass on those expectations to any third party
who received the founder's stock through purchase, gift, or
inheritance. Under this position, specific reasonable
expectations would run with the shares, rather than with the
shareholders. 75
For various reasons, this position is untenable. Most
importantly, specific reasonable expectations are personal in
nature. 76  As mentioned, under the investment model, a
specific reasonable expectation represents an individually
tailored investment bargain that a majority shareholder
175. Cf Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 573 (N.C. 1983) (Martin,
J., concurring) ("Another circumstance to be considered is the fact that most, if
not all, of plaintiffs stock was given to him by his father. He did not
contribute his own hard-earned cash to the enterprise. This could indicate
that he did not assume the risk of having his investment held hostage by the
majority, or it could be that one has to accept what one gets by gift-in this
case, a locked-in minority interest in a family corporation." (emphasis added)).
176. See Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term
1984) ("The original participants in a close corporation enter into their
agreement on the basis of the assessments of each others talents, assets,
intentions and characters and their agreement must, therefore, be regarded as
personal in nature. Unless there is an unmistakable expression of their intent
to the contrary, the agreement will not 'run with the shares."); Bahls, supra
note 10, at 326 ("The intent of original shareholders to operate the business is
usually personal in nature. An expectation that one will participate in
management of the business does not necessarily mean that one's son,
daughter, ex-spouse, or other transferee will have the same opportunity.");
Hillman, supra note 14, at 86 n.265 ("Ordinarily, expectations are personal
and therefore would not be transferable .... Thus, an individual who acquires




entered into with a particular minority shareholder. 1'7 In
theory, therefore, it makes no sense to allow a third party to
assert rights under a bargain that was struck between two
different parties and that was tailored to the needs and wishes
of those two different parties.7 8
In practice, the problematic nature of the position is even
more stark. A majority shareholder may have been willing to
promise employment or management to a prospective investor
because of the skills and talents that the investor offered. A
prospective investor with experience in the relevant industry of
a close corporation, for example, is likely a more valuable
employee to the business than a prospective investor without
such experience. Because of such personal considerations, it is
unreasonable to allow these promises of employment,
management, or some other benefit to pass (through gift,
inheritance, or otherwise) to transferees who lack the skills,
talents, or experience of the transferor.7 9 Indeed, it seems
rather unfair to bind the majority to employ an unskilled
transferee of stock simply because the transferor's abilities
garnered a promise of employment.8 ° As a New York court
bluntly stated, "Even if an original participant had.., a
reasonable expectation of personal employment, after his death
the surviving shareholders would not be bound to employ any
dolt who happened to inherit his stock."' 8 Because of what
different investors can bring to the table, it is simply
unworkable to contend that a majority promise of employment
or management made to one party should necessarily transfer
to another party.
177. See supra text accompanying note 162; supra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text.
178. This proposition assumes the absence of a third-party beneficiary
situation. In that context, a third party would be entitled to assert rights
under a bargain struck between other parties. See infra Part IV.D.2
(discussing a third-party beneficiary analysis).
179. See supra note 176.
180. Cf UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g) (1914) ("No person can become a
member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners."); WILLIAM L.
CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
69 (7th ed. 1995) (unabridged) ("Under UPA § 18(g), however, no person can
become a partner without the consent of all the partners. It follows that
unless the partnership agreement otherwise provides, a partner cannot make
a transfer of his partnership interest that would substitute the transferee as a
partner in the transferor's place.").




Finally, these problems are compounded in situations
where the transferor distributes its stock to multiple
transferees. When a founder dies, for example, its
shareholdings may very well pass via inheritance to a number
of friends or relatives. Similarly, a shareholder may distribute
portions of its holdings as gifts over the years to numerous
recipients. Does the transferor's specific reasonable
expectation of employment or management pass to all of these
transferees? Would a majority shareholder be obliged to
employ multiple unskilled and inexperienced transferees to
fend off the possibility of oppression liability?18 2 Surely the
answer to both of these questions is no. When considering
multiple transferees, it is even more evident that a "pass with
the shares" position is one that the oppression doctrine should
avoid.'83
D. POSITION THREE: ANY SPECIFIC REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
THAT CAN BE PROVEN
As previously discussed, one could take the position that
non-investing shareholders are not entitled to any specific
reasonable expectations because of their failure to contribute
capital to the business. Such a blanket denial of specific
reasonable expectations, however, seems overly restrictive. A
slight modification of an earlier hypothetical helps to convey
this point. Assume that a 60% majority shareholder and two
20% minority shareholders start a business as a close
corporation. They all invest their own capital at the time they
join the venture and they all quit their prior employment
positions to begin serving full-time as employees and managers
of the close corporation. Six months after the company's
inception, assume that one of the minority shareholders passes
away. His wife, who is employed outside of the close
corporation, inherits his stock. Assume further that the wife
quits her outside employment and, with the full support of the
other shareholders, commences employment with the close
182. Multiple generations further complicate this problem. If a transferor
can pass on its specific reasonable expectations to several transferees (e.g., its
children), the transferees can presumably pass on the same expectations (e.g.,
to their children).
183. In addition, to the extent that one believes that reasonable
expectations can change over time, see supra Part III, it is arguably
inconsistent to contend that non-investing shareholders are stuck solely with




Over the next fifteen years, this arrangement continues.
During that time, the company issues additional stock to bring
in three other investors, and they all take employment
positions with the company. In addition, the company
distributes all profits as salary and other employment-related
benefits during this time period. At the end of fifteen years,
assume that the majority unjustifiably terminates both the wife
and the founding minority shareholder.
In this situation, it seems odd to suggest that the founding
minority has a reasonable expectation of employment while the
transferee wife does not. Both shareholders quit their prior
employment to begin working for the close corporation,
presumably because the close corporation job offered benefits
that were not available in their prior positions.'84 Both
shareholders worked for the company for approximately fifteen
years. ' Further, and as noted, the fact that all of the
shareholders work for the company and that profits are
distributed solely as employment-related benefits is evidence
suggesting a mutual understanding that stockholders are
entitled to continued employment.86 The facts suggest, in other
words, that both shareholders have specific reasonable
expectations of employment that are frustrated when the
benefits of these close corporation jobs are unjustifiably
terminated by the majority. 87 Given the similarity of the
184. See supra notes 97-98, 133 and accompanying text; cf In re Kemp &
Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) ("As a matter of fact,
providing employment for himself may have been the principal reason why he
participated in organizing the corporation." (internal quotation omitted));
Murdock, supra note 30, at 472 ("[W]hat is at stake in the 'oppression! cases is
often a job-a very attractive job."); Ragazzo, supra note 74, at 1110 (noting
that a close corporation shareholder "often invests for the purpose of having a
job").
185. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 20, at 217 (observing that expectations
can be derived from the parties' actions); cf Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) ("The reasonable expectations of the shareholders,
as they exist at the inception of the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter
through a course of dealing concurred in by all of them, is perhaps the most
reliable guide to a just solution of a dispute among shareholders, at least a
dispute among shareholders in the typical close corporation." (emphasis
added)).
186. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
187. Even if the company altered its profit distribution scheme after the
terminations to provide the discharged shareholders with "true" dividends in
the amount of their proportionate share of the profits, oppression liability
should still arise. While the shareholders' general reasonable expectations of
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shareholders' situations, an attempt to justify a difference in
treatment by the oppression doctrine seems unwarranted."
From an equitable standpoint, therefore, a position that
non-investing shareholders can have specific reasonable
expectations is sensible. Significantly, this position only states
that non-investing shareholders can have specific reasonable
expectations. If the shareholder cannot adduce the requisite
proof of a shared understanding, no specific reasonable
expectation will be found.'89 While the fairness of this outcome
may be relatively easy to understand, however, the process of
fitting the result within the investment model is more difficult.
As mentioned, under the investment model, a specific
reasonable expectation is simply a shorthand reference for a
bargain struck between the majority and minority shareholders
over an entitlement the minority is to receive in return for its
commitment of capital.90 By definition, of course, the non-
investing shareholder has made no commitment of capital.
Thus, one must stretch the theory of the investment model to
accommodate a result that allows non-investing shareholders
to have specific reasonable expectations. There are several
a proportionate stake in the company's profits would be satisfied, the
shareholders' specific reasonable expectations of continued benefits from their
close corporation positions would be frustrated. See Moll, supra note 50, at
568 ("[Elven if a shareholder-employee receives 'true' dividends after
termination in the same amount as the de facto dividends received before
termination, oppression liability should still arise if the discharge frustrated a
specific reasonable expectation of employment.").
188. See In re Schlachter, 546 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Div. 1989) ("This
[reasonable expectations] standard is equally applicable to [a] situation such
as the instant case, where the shareholder's stock interest was a gift."); In re
Smith, 546 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (App. Div. 1989) ("[W]e are of the opinion,
contrary to the appellants' contention, that the 'reasonable expectation'
standard can be applied to a case in which a stock interest is inherited.. .");
In re Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (App. Div.
1985) ("[P]etitioners received their shares as gifts; therefore there was no
'investment' which is a prerequisite to a finding of whether there is any other
means by which they can expect to obtain a 'fair return on their
investment.'... In any event, it seems clear that the holders of over 41% of a
successful corporation are entitled to have their interests protected, regardless
of whether or not those shares were received as gifts." (citation omitted)); cf
Hillman, supra note 14, at 86 n.265 ("Ordinarily, expectations are personal
and therefore would not be transferable .... Thus, an individual who acquires
stock by gift or inheritance would not also take the expectations of the original
owner. However, an individual in such a position may develop mutual
expectations with the other participants which should be recognized."
(emphasis added)).
189. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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different ways in which this could be done.
1. Pass the Investment to the Transferee
The investment model could assume that the investment of
the transferor has passed to the transferee. Under this
assumption, the doctrine would treat the non-investing
shareholder as if it actually made the investment itself. If the
transferee can then demonstrate that it reached a shared
understanding with the majority for the provision of a specific
benefit, the arrangement will be characterized as a bargained-
for benefit that was promised in return for the transferee's
"investment." In this manner, the result of allowing non-
investing shareholders to have specific reasonable expectations
can fit within the framework of the investment model.
Treating the investment of the transferor as the
investment of the transferee is actually quite appropriate. The
transferor's commitment of financial capital is represented by
the shares of stock. When the original investor transfers those
shares (via gift, inheritance, or otherwise) to another party, it is
like the capital contribution was transferred to the other party,
at least to the extent that the transferee is now the party who
possesses the right to recover the capital contribution, along
with any appreciation or depreciation, upon the dissolution or
sale of the company (or sale of the shares themselves).'9'
Indeed, under general corporate law, it is the party with lawful
ownership of the share certificates who has a rightful claim to
the capital represented by those certificates-not the party who
actually contributed the capital in the first place. 9' Thus, it
191. See, e.g., RMBCA, supra note 22, § 14.05(a) (1993) (stating that a
dissolved corporation may "distribut[e] its remaining property among its
shareholders according to their interests" (emphasis added)); supra note 66
(observing that the conventional dissolution proceeding determines the value
of a business and awards each stockholder its proportionate share of that
value); cf O'Neill, supra note 71, at 663 ("The shareholder of a publicly traded
corporation may realize a return on her investment in either of two ways:
directly, by a distribution of dividends, or indirectly, by an increase in the
market value of her shares"); Schlafge, supra note 59, at 1077 n.29 ("Both
[public corporation and close corporation] investors expect appreciation in the
value of their investment.").
192. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text; cf Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979)
("[Ilt must be [a father-in-law] alone who advanced money from his adequate
funds to purchase the stock. These findings, however, do not carry the day for
defendants. Legal title to the stock resides in [the son-in-law] and his claim of
'oppression' must be considered....").
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makes sense for oppression law to treat giftees or beneficiaries
of stock as if theyhad made a financial investment in the
company themselves.
It is worth repeating that treating a non-investing
shareholder as if it had committed the capital itself does not
automatically provide the shareholder with a specific
reasonable expectation. Specific reasonable expectations arise
only if the evidence indicates that a majority shareholder and a
particular minority shareholder reached a mutual
understanding about an entitlement the minority is to receive
in return for its investment in the business.'93 While treating a
giftee or beneficiary of stock as if it had committed the capital
itself provides such a party with the requisite investment, it
does nothing to establish the mutual understanding or bargain
that is also required for a specific reasonable expectation. 94
Stated differently, treating non-investing shareholders as if
they had invested themselves gives these stockholders only the
opportunity to prove the existence of a specific reasonable
expectation. Unlike a position that automatically grants non-
investing shareholders specific reasonable expectations-e.g.,
where non-investing shareholders assume, as a matter of law,
their transferor's expectations 95-- this position merely allows
the non-investing shareholder the chance to present evidence of
an explicit or implicit understanding that it reached with the
majority. Even with a transferred "investment," therefore, if a
shareholder cannot produce sufficient evidence of a bargain or
mutual understanding, no specific reasonable expectation has
been established. 96  As a consequence, the shareholder
oppression doctrine will have no specific reasonable expectation
to enforce.
2. Apply a Third-Party Beneficiary Analysis
In some instances, majority and minority investors may
reach an understanding that a benefit will be provided to
193. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the possibility of the transferee
assuming the transferor's specific reasonable expectations).
196. See, e.g., In re Smith, 546 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (App. Div. 1989) ("While
we are of the opinion, contrary to the appellants' contention, that the
'reasonable expectation' standard can be applied to a case in which a stock
interest is inherited, the petitioner's conduct did not evidence a reasonable
expectation of being an active participant in the management of the
corporations."); supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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someone other than the minority in return for the minority's
commitment of capital. For example, founding majority and
minority shareholders may agree that the minority's
investment in the company entitles it to continuous
employment and, upon its death, entitles its daughter to
continuous employment. In such a situation, it is fair to say
that the minority has a specific reasonable expectation of
employment due to its investment and the explicit or implicit
promise of employment that it received in return for that
investment.9 7 It is also fair to say, however, that the daughter
possesses a specific reasonable expectation of employment-not
because she struck an investment bargain herself, but because
she can be characterized as a third-party beneficiary of the
investment bargain struck between her father and the majority
shareholder.'9 Indeed, the founders intended the arrangement
to benefit the daughter, as the majority (the promisor) made a
promise to the minority (the promisee) to employ the minority's
daughter (the beneficiary) in return for consideration (the
minority's investment).' 9  Under the investment model, in
other words, even though the daughter did not commit any of
her own capital to the venture, her desire for employment can
be enforced as a specific reasonable expectation because it
literally falls within the reasonable expectations conception.
2 0
The daughter's desire for employment is indeed the product of a
bargain struck between the shareholders over an entitlement
the minority is to receive in return for its investment. That
197. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979) (discussing
intended and incidental beneficiaries of a contract).
199. See id. § 302 ("Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and
promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of
a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties and... the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.");
FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, § 10.3, at 679 ("In order to be an intended
beneficiary of a gift promise, one must show both that this is 'appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties' and that 'the circumstances indicate
that the promisee intended to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance."); supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing
consideration); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 cmt. b (1979)
("This Section reflects the basic principle that the parties to a contract have
the power, if they so intend, to create a right in a third person.").
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1979) ("A promise
in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to




minority entitlement, of course, is the right to have its
daughter employed by the company after the minority's death,
but it is no different than any other bargained-for benefit that
the minority might have received more directly (e.g.,
continuous employment or management participation for the
minority itself). Indeed, it bears repeating that the majority
assented to this arrangement in return for the minority's
capital. Allowing the majority shareholder to deny the
daughter employment, therefore, is as much a breach of the
minority's investment bargain with the majority as the
unjustified termination of the minority's own employment.
Thus, a third-party beneficiary analysis fits within the theory
of the investment model and provides another way of thinking
about the specific reasonable expectations of non-investing
shareholders. 1
The downside of the third-party beneficiary analysis is that
it is only applicable when (1) a minority investor has the
foresight to make arrangements for third parties, and (2) when
the majority shareholder agrees to such arrangements. °2
Given that close corporation ventures often lack future-oriented
planning,213 it is fair to say that these situations will not
frequently arise. Unlike the "passed investment" approach,
201. Cf Bahls, supra note 10, at 326 n.251 ("Sometimes... founding
shareholders will have expectations as to how heirs, donees or involuntary
transferees should be treated. Expectations might include continued
employment or continued dividend payments. These shareholders then are
akin to third party beneficiaries of the original parties and should be entitled
to protection of those expectations." (emphasis added)).
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 cmt. b (1979) ('This
Section reflects the basic principle that the parties to a contract have the
power, if they so intend, to create a right in a third person. The requirements
for formation of a contract must of course be met .... " (emphasis added));
MURRAY, supra note 126, § 28, at 51 (noting that mutual assent and a definite
agreement are "essential elements to the formation of the typical contract"
(footnote omitted)).
203. See, e.g., Chittur, supra note 134, at 131 (observing that "people
generally avoid complex and expensive planning in small businesses"); id. at
139 (stating that "inadequately planned close corporations will always remain
part of the picture," and noting that "[tihe most careful plan may fail to
visualize some conflicts, even if it does not generate novel ones of its own"); see
also O'Neal, supra note 99, at 883-84 ("A person taking a minority position in
a close corporation often leaves himself vulnerable to squeeze-out or
oppression by failing to insist upon a shareholders' agreement or appropriate
charter or bylaw provisions .... "); Thompson, supra note 20, at 237 ("The
relationship among participants in a close corporation requires the ongoing
exercise of mutual discretion for which advance[d] planning would be
impossible or prohibitively expensive.").
780 [Vol.86:717
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
therefore, the third-party beneficiary analysis provides a
framework for non-investing shareholders to have specific
reasonable expectations only in a narrow range of cases.
3. Depart From an Investment-Centered Reasonable
Expectations Standard
A final approach to allowing non-investing shareholders to
have specific reasonable expectations is to abandon the
prerequisite notion of an investment altogether. The New York
decision of Gimpel v. Bolstein essentially took this approach by
deciding, in a dispute involving non-investing shareholders, to
measure oppression by the alternative definition of
"burdensome, harsh, and wrongful conduct... a visible
departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of
fair play."204  Under this approach, a non-investing
shareholder's right to continued employment or other
entitlement would stem not from that shareholder's reasonable
expectation of receiving its bargained-for benefits, but would
derive instead from the "unfairness" associated with
terminating the shareholder's employment or denying the
shareholder some other benefit.
The vagueness of such a "wrongful" or "unfair" standard,
however, is problematic, as it provides little coherent guidance
regarding what constitutes oppressive conduct. 5 Whereas an
204. 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018, 1020 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1984).
205. For example, under a "wrongful" or "unfair" standard, it is difficult to
explain how a termination of employment could be oppressive in an
employment at will jurisdiction. See, e.g., Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,
26 (Okla. 1989) (The classic statement of the at-will rule was that an
employer may discharge an employee for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."); 1
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 112, § 8.1, at 671 ("The employment at will
doctrine... provided that an employee without a contract for a fixed term
could be fired for any reason or no reason at all."). After all, terminating an
employee for any reason or for no reason at all is often viewed as "unfair," but
employment "unfairness" is, to some extent, permitted by the at-will doctrine.
See, e.g., Webster v. Schauble, 400 P.2d 292, 292, 294 (Wash. 1965) (stating
that the plaintiffs termination of employment was "a result of probably unfair
and certainly ruthless treatment," but concluding that plaintiff had no remedy
due to the employment at will doctrine). An investment-centered reasonable
expectations approach, however, makes it clear that a termination of
employment can be oppressive, even in an employment at will jurisdiction,
because close corporation shareholders often have an investment interest in
their jobs rather than a mere employment interest. See, e.g., Moll, supra note
50, at 538-39 ("Discharge-related harms suffered in an employee capacity...
fall within the province of employment at will.... [Ilt makes conceptual sense
20021
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investment-centered reasonable expectations standard defines
oppression as majority conduct that breaches an investment
bargain with a minority shareholder, the "wrongful" or "unfair"
standard provides no such context. Similarly, under the
investment model, the reasonable expectations standard
conveys to both courts and shareholders that, before the
oppression doctrine will provide specific protection, proof of
majority promises made in return for the minority's investment
is required. Under a "wrongful" or "unfair" standard, however,
it is unclear what evidence will be required to warrant the
protection of the doctrine. Simply put, by conceiving of
oppression as a doctrine that protects bargained-for investment
expectations, rather than a doctrine that polices a seemingly
free-floating notion of unfairness, the doctrine is provided with
standards that courts and shareholders can use in assessing
whether oppressive conduct has occurred.
In summary, although non-investing shareholders will
receive some protection under the oppression doctrine even
without specific reasonable expectations (the protection of
general reasonable expectations), it is both equitable and
sensible to provide these shareholders with the opportunity to
prove that a mutual understanding-i.e., a specific reasonable
expectation-was reached with the majority shareholder. By
treating the investment of the transferor as the investment of
the transferee, the law can protect such a specific reasonable
expectation as an "investment bargain" without the limitations
of the third-party beneficiary analysis or the vagaries of an
"unfairness" standard. As long as the requisite evidence is
adduced, the oppression doctrine should treat the non-investing
shareholder and the investing shareholder in an equivalent
206
manner.
to invoke the doctrine of shareholder oppression only where the loss of a
shareholder-employee's job damages the value of that shareholder-employee's
investment. In such circumstances, the loss of the job represents harm
suffered in a shareholder capacity and, as a consequence, the termination falls
outside of the proper scope of the at-will doctrine." (first emphasis added)).
206. The death of the majority shareholder adds another wrinkle to the
analysis. Assume, for example, that a minority shareholder establishes that
the majority promised continued employment in return for the minority's
investment in the business. Because of this bargain, the minority has an
enforceable specific reasonable expectation of employment. Assume further,
however, that the majority dies and that her son inherits her controlling
interest in the company. Is the employment bargain struck between the
minority and the former majority binding upon the new majority shareholder,
or can the new majority terminate the minority without fear of oppression
[Vol.86:717
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V. THE ROLE OF THE TRANSFEROR'S INTENT
In situations where majority and minority shareholders
have agreed to provide a benefit to a third party, the
transferor's intent is significant. In these third-party
beneficiary arrangements, there is no reason to deny a
transferor's intent to, for example, provide its daughter with
employment in the close corporation. After all, the
liability?
On the one hand, the son was not a party to the bargain between the
minority and the former majority and, similarly, he did not explicitly assent to
the arrangement. On the other hand, allowing the new majority to disclaim
prior bargains and understandings results in the minority becoming a party to
a different investment bargain that it may not agree with (e.g., an
arrangement without an assurance of continued employment). Either way,
one party is subject to the terms of a bargain that it may not have assented to.
In most instances, the minority will have greater difficulty handling this
"nonconsensual" burden. Simply put, the minority has no options. Given that
the minority has no ability to extract an investment that has already been
made, an oppression framework that allows a new majority to ignore prior
investment bargains effectively licenses the majority to commence a freeze-
out. Although the minority negotiated for continued employment before
committing its capital to the venture, such a framework allows the new
majority to ignore the promise of employment while retaining the minority's
investment.
In contrast, the majority shareholder does have options if it disagrees
with the investment bargains entered into by its predecessor. First, the
majority can always circumvent the predecessor's bargains if it is willing to
buy out the minority's holdings at "fair value." After all, "fair value" is what
the minority is likely to receive if it prevails in an oppression action. See
supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining that a buyout remedy
provides the shareholder with the "fair value" of its investment). In a sense,
therefore, the prior investment bargains limit the majority only to the extent
that it (or the corporation) is unwilling to bear the expense of a "fair value"
buyout. See supra note 68. But see Hillman, supra note 14, at 70-75 (stating
that "[t]he assumption that those who desire to avoid a dissolution of the
corporate enterprise may easily do so by purchasing the interest of a
dissatisfied minority shareholder ignores a number of problems which may be
encountered by those who wish to continue the venture," and discussing those
problems (citation omitted)). Second, in many jurisdictions, the majority
shareholder can unilaterally dissolve the company. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1900(a) (West 1990) ("Any corporation may elect voluntarily to wind up and
dissolve by the vote of shareholders holding shares representing 50 percent or
more of the voting power."); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1001(a) (McKinney 2001)
("Such dissolution [of a corporation] shall be authorized at a meeting of
shareholders by... a majority of the votes of all outstanding shares entitled to
vote thereon ... ."). Unlike the minority shareholder, therefore, the
dissatisfied majority stockholder can extract its investment. See supra note
66. Finally, to the extent that the new majority has accepted the benefits of
its stock inheritance (i.e., the power to control the company), it may be
appropriate to require the majority to accept the burdens of the inheritance as
well (i.e., the bargains struck by the predecessor).
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arrangement is only enforced because it is consensual between
the majority and minority shareholders. If the majority
shareholder had not assented to the third-party benefit, there
would be no mutual understanding or bargain to enforce.
Where there is only one founding investor, however, it is
worth asking whether that shareholder's intent should have
any bearing on the reasonable expectations of successor
shareholders who receive their stock through gift or
inheritance. Assume, for example, that upon reaching
retirement age, a sole founding shareholder of a close
corporation decides to give 60% of his holdings to a daughter
and 40% of his holdings to a son. Assume further that the
founder explicitly conveys his intent that the son shall remain
employed by the close corporation. If both children accept the
gift, is the daughter (the majority shareholder) bound to
continually employ the son (the minority shareholder)?
Under the investment model's view of reasonable
expectations, a specific reasonable expectation only exists if a
majority and minority shareholder both assent to a bargain
that provides for a specific benefit such as employment. 28 It is
hard to argue that the requisite assent is present in this
hypothetical, as the situation is not one where the employment
"terms" of the arrangement are bargained for between the
majority and minority themselves. Instead, the terms are more
or less injected into the shareholders' relationship without any
form of bargaining at all. Similarly, given that an ever-
changing business world requires the majority shareholder to
possess sufficient flexibility to make decisions, 209 it is sensible
for the law to avoid limiting this business discretion unless the
majority has assented, either explicitly or implicitly, to such a
limitation.210 From this standpoint, one could argue that the
207. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63; supra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657,
663 (Mass. 1976) ("[Wle acknowledge the fact that the controlling group in a
close corporation must have some room to maneuver in establishing the
business policy of the corporation. It must have a large measure of discretion,
for example, in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge
or consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing
directors with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees.").
210. Cf. Maul v. Van Keppel, 714 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("[A]
departure from general corporate law is warranted only when (1) the
shareholders agreed to bind themselves to partner-like conduct or (2) each
shareholder intended to treat the others as equal partners.").
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majority daughter would not be bound to employ the minority
son absent other evidence indicating that the shareholders
have reached a mutual understanding between themselves
regarding continued employment for the minority.
211
There is room, however, for a contrary position. One could
argue that the majority daughter has assented to continually
employ the minority son because she cannot accept the benefits
of the gift without the accompanying burdens. In other words,
to the extent that the majority has accepted the benefits of the
gift by assuming control of the business as the majority
shareholder, she could arguably be deemed to have also
assented to the employment restriction involving the minority
son.212 If such an argument is accepted, the investment model
211. The language of one court reflects such an argument:
Although Maul [a minority shareholder] states in her affidavit that
her mother gave and bequeathed equal shares to each daughter, those
statements are not probative of an agreement among the
shareholders. The statements may demonstrate the mother's intent
that the daughters forever maintain equal ownership of the farm
corporation, but the mother's intent was not binding upon the
daughters.... [Tihere was no agreement between the
shareholders/sisters to maintain equal ownership, to be treated as
partners, or to offer each other rights of first refusal on available
shares. Further, there is no evidence of a meeting of the minds or of
mutual intent to maintain equal ownership. Absent such evidence,
the court cannot impose a duty upon the shareholders/sisters to
maintain equal ownership or to offer each other rights of first refusal.
Id. at 711-12. Of course, "other evidence" of an employment understanding
between the shareholders may include the majority itself promising
employment, the existence of an express employment agreement for the
minority, a company policy of providing employment for all of its shareholders,
the minority actually working for the company for some period of time, or the
company's use of salary and other employment-related benefits to distribute
the profits of the business. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3a) (West
2002) ("[Any written agreements, including employment agreements and buy-
sell agreements, between or among shareholders or between or among one or
more shareholders and the corporation are presumed to reflect the parties'
reasonable expectations concerning matters dealt with in the agreements.");
Kelly v. Rudd, No. C7-91-1142, 1992 WL 3651, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14,
1992) (noting that "agreements affect the reasonableness of appellants
expectations"); supra notes 103, 141 and accompanying text.
Even without a specific reasonable expectation of employment, it is
important to note that the minority son's "shareholder" status will still entitle
him to general reasonable expectation protection. See supra notes 156-60 and
accompanying text.
212. Cf Ferber v. Am. Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. 1983) ("It
would be anomalous and inequitable to hold that while the Cohen brothers
may utilize the bequests in their father's will to assume control of the family
business, they may disregard other provisions of that will which limits their
power to dispose of the earnings from the family business for their own
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could enforce the expectation as if the majority and minority
themselves struck a bargain regarding the minority's continued
employment. Alternatively, to the extent that the bargain is
conceived as having been struck between the founder and the
majority (where the founder gives stock in return for the
majority's promise to employ the minority), the minority could
enforce the bargain under the investment model on a third-
party beneficiary basis. 3
Ultimately, in these "one founder" cases, the founder's
intent may be better viewed simply as an evidentiary factor for
a court to consider in the reasonable expectations analysis. As a
mere factor, the founder's intent should neither bind the
majority shareholder nor be per se irrelevant to the reasonable
24
expectations inquiry. 14 Indeed, the founder's intent may be
difficult to carry out as the corporation evolves over the years,2 15
but that intent may nevertheless shed some light on the
"reasonableness" of an asserted expectation.216 Thus, when a
benefit.").
213. See supra Part IV.D.2.
214. See, e.g., 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 21, § 7:15, at 91-92 ("If shares
have been received by inheritance or gift, the donor's wishes may have some
bearing on whether the donee's expectations are reasonable." (emphasis
added)).
215. Assume, for example, that a close corporation manufactures and
distributes a clothing line and a cosmetics line. Both lines of business are
profitable. Upon retirement, the sole founder of the company transfers his
stock to family members with the explicit intent that the company always
remain in both lines of business and that the founder's son shall manage the
enterprise. As the years pass, however, assume that changing consumer
tastes ultimately cause the clothing line to become highly unprofitable. Under
such circumstances, it may be fair to say that the founder's intent is no longer
practicable and that the controlling shareholder of the company should not be
bound to continue a losing segment of the business. Similarly, surely the
founder's intent that his son shall manage the business should not continue to
bind the shareholders if the son ultimately proves to be incompetent. Simply
put, there are times when the realities of business should outweigh the
founder's wishes. Cf Bahls, supra note 10, at 327 ("IT]he business may have
changed so much that reasonable expectations can no longer be fulfilled. For
example, due to changes in business conditions, a corporation once able to
support two or more owners,... may no longer be able to provide sufficient
support."); id. ("A brother and sister, for example, might decide to incorporate
the family farm to provide a livelihood for both of them, even though the farm
is simply too small to provide the expected support.").
216. In Nixon v. Blackwell, for example, a sole shareholder founded a close
corporation with two classes of common stock-class A voting stock and class
B non-voting stock. 626 A-2d 1366, 1370 (Del. 1993). Upon the founder's
death, his testamentary plan resulted in the transfer of the class A voting
stock to the key employees of the company and most of the class B non-voting
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minority shareholder claims a reasonable expectation of
management participation, for example, a founder's intent that
the minority remain as a passive investor should be viewed
merely as evidence that the minority's expectation of
management is unreasonable. As a mere evidentiary factor,
however, the founder's intent can be outweighed by other
evidence suggesting the reasonableness of the shareholder's
expectation (e.g., a majority promise of a management role, or
the company's history of placing shareholders in management
positions).1 7
stock to the founder's family. See id. In subsequent years, the corporation
established an employee stock ownership plan (an "ESOP") for the benefit of
the company employees and, for certain employees, the corporation purchased
"key man" life insurance policies with death benefits payable to the
corporation. See id. at 1371-72. The plaintiffs were a group of class B
shareholders who claimed that the defendants "breach[ed] their fiduciary
duties by pursuing a discriminatory liquidity policy that favors employee
stockholders over non-employee stockholders through the ESOP and key man
life insurance policies." Id. at 1370, 1373.
Although the court did not speak in the language of "reasonable
expectations," it effectively concluded that the plaintiffs had no reasonable
expectation of equal liquidity with the employee shareholders. See id. at 1376.
Indeed, the court noted that "stockholders need not always be treated equally
for all purposes," it pointed out that ESOPs and key man insurance programs
are "normal corporate practice[s]," and it observed that because ESOPs are
"normally established for employees.., there is no inequity in limiting ESOP
benefits to the employee stockholders." Id. at 1376-77, 1379. Significantly,
however, the Nixon court also considered the founder's intent as a factor
contributing to its decision:
The directors have followed a consistent policy originally established
by Mr. Barton, the founder of the Corporation, whose intent from the
formation of the Corporation was to use the Class A stock as the
vehicle for the Corporation's continuity through employee
management and ownership. Mr. Barton established the corporation
in 1928 by creating two classes of stock, not one, and by holding 100
percent of the Class A stock and 82 percent of the Class B stock. Mr.
Barton himself established the practice of purchasing key man life
insurance with funds of the Corporation to retain in the employ of the
Corporation valuable employees .... The directors' actions following
Mr. Barton's death are consistent with Mr. Barton's plan.
Id. at 1379.
217. Courts may give greater weight to a founder's intent when stock is
transferred through a will rather than as a mere gift. The effect of
testamentary intent under the law of wills, in other words, may lead a court to
treat "inheritance" cases differently from mere "gift" cases. See, e.g., Ferber v.
Am. Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. 1983) ("The present case combines,
to some degree, the law of corporations and the law of wills....
[C]onsideration must be given to the testamentary intent of Ms. Ferber's
father .... Therefore, in making its equitable determination as to the
reasonableness of compensation paid to the brothers, the trial court must




In the business world, change is a virtual certainty.
Moreover, in close corporations, the presence of family is almost
as certain, as family-owned enterprises are, and will likely
remain, a significant component of the overall business
landscape.218 Given these realities, disputes involving changed
shareholder expectations and gifted or inherited stock-
disputes that have already started to surface in oppression
decisions-will only become more prevalent as the oppression
doctrine develops further. As a consequence, there is a
pressing need to address these issues. By calling attention to
the issues of changing expectations and non-investing
shareholders, this Article has revealed that a "time of
investment" standard for measuring reasonable expectations-
a standard that a number of jurisdictions have adopted-is too
narrowly focused. As a result, it inadequately protects
shareholders whose expectations have changed since the time
of their investment as well as shareholders who have not
contributed any of their own capital to the business.
In light of this significant shortcoming, a broader
reasonable expectations perspective is needed. By conceiving of
oppression as a doctrine that protects the fair value of the
shareholder's investment, this Article has suggested that a
reasonable expectation should be viewed as a bargain struck
between majority and minority shareholders over a specific
entitlement the minority is to receive in return for its
investment in the company. As explained, however, close
corporation shareholders may strike these "investment
bargains" throughout their course of dealing with each other.
Thus, with respect to the problem of changing expectations,
this Article has argued for a reasonable expectations standard
sense, but also what would be reasonable in light of that provision of Benjamin
Cohen's will which clearly intends that a benefit should flow from the family
business to all the named children."); id. at 1050-51 (Hutchison, J.,
concurring) ("Placing the burden of proof on the appellants would simplify the
Chancellor's task of effectuating the testamentary intent of appellee's father
that appellee share, in a meaningful way, in the corporate profits."). But see
Maul v. Van Keppel, 714 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("Although
Maul [a minority shareholder] states in her affidavit that her mother gave and
bequeathed equal shares to each daughter, those statements are not probative
of an agreement among the shareholders. The statements may demonstrate
the mother's intent that the daughters forever maintain equal ownership of
the farm corporation, but the mother's intent was not binding upon the
daughters." (emphasis added)).
218. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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that protects shareholders' investment bargains whenever they
may be struck, rather than merely at the time of investment.
More importantly, by looking to corporate law's effort to
prevent freeze-outs as well as contract law's recognition of
relational arrangements, this Article has provided strong
rationales for its contentions that post-investment expectations
can and should be protected.
With respect to the puzzle of the non-investing
shareholder, this Article has asserted that stockholders who
receive their shares through gift or inheritance should be
treated equivalently to stockholders who actually contribute
their own capital to the venture. The non-investing
shareholder, in other words, should have the same opportunity
as the investing shareholder to prove that it reached a bargain
or understanding with the majority shareholder (i.e., to prove
that a specific reasonable expectation existed). The investment
model of oppression assists in this conclusion as well. Indeed,
by demonstrating that it is appropriate to treat the investment
of the transferor as the investment of the transferee, this
Article is able to characterize a mutual understanding between
a majority shareholder and a non-investing minority
shareholder as a protected "investment bargain--a bargain
that can be enforced as a specific reasonable expectation.
In short, the plight of the close corporation minority
shareholder is real. Although the shareholder oppression
doctrine has made great strides in strengthening the rights of
minority shareholders, the doctrine's vitality depends on its
ability to effectively respond to new problems and situations.
While a "time of investment" expectations inquiry may have
sufficed for most of the published oppression decisions to date,
its blemishes can no longer be ignored. For disputes involving
change, gifts, or inheritances, a broader perspective is needed.
2002] 789
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